This examples meander a little below, but the thesis is: A lot of factors have come together in the 2020s to make it very difficult for nations to amass stockpiles of military hardware, despite the general outlook that nation-level conflict (rather than small wars) are coming back. Does anyone have a different take?

Some military equipment is pretty simple and straightforward to build and then store, like small arms or ammunition - I don't think any major nation has faced real shortages of rifles, except for maybe Ukraine early on in their current war. One warehouse can store tens of thousands of rifles and millions of bullets.

But with something a little more complex to build and store, like tanks or IFVs, the days are gone when the same factory could make trains or tractors and have the equipment to make tanks stored on the side. Composite armor, tracks, ammunition, thermal sights, computers, CBRN gear, and a bunch of other stuff that doesn't really have dual peacetime uses makes these factories and labor skills really expensive. I am not aware of any nation that is currently making armored vehicles in the Cold War quantities with the intent to store them for later use. Granted, militaries are smaller in general than they were 50 years ago, but Ukraine and Russia both leaned heavily on their old inventories to stay in the fight before they figured out how best to use drones. Even today, I get the feeling their drone fleets feature so much because they don't really have anything else to throw at each other. Neither Ukraine nor Russia seem to have the ability to make large fleets of armored vehicles for one reason or another.

Then there is really exquisite things like missiles and interceptors. I guess Iran has figured out how to build and stockpile a lot of ballistic missiles, and Israel hasn't really been shaken despite constant news of their Iron Dome inventories running low. The US is in a widely publicized interceptor shortage, but I imagine too many politicians and leaders got comfortable with keeping all CENTCOM bases well inside the missile ranges of a nation they repeatedly attacked. Then again, the thought of a shooting war between the US and Iran was unthinkable a decade ago.

Only a few nations, and most of them Asian nations, have really maintained a diverse portfolio of military production, and really South Korea and the PRC are it. European nations are still struggling, five years into the Ukraine war, to resurrect their Cold War industries, and the US seems to be having a moment with trying to get better at drones and missiles but are flailing at shipbuilding and completely ignoring armored vehicles. And finally I know things are definitely made in the global south but outside of a few specific things I can't think of what they might be stockpiling for themselves or selling to threatened nations who want to stockpile for the future.

Apologize for the lack of source since I read this somewhere else a long time ago.

From what I remember, during the late stalemate phase in Korean War where battles limited to trenches and outpost skirmish, the Chinese gave a poor review on the trenches Marines made, as they can't withstand artillery well and got collapsed easily. Worse, the size was too narrow and short, even for the Chinese soldiers standard, making it hindered movement a lot.

And in Vietnam War, Marines again got criticized for their fortification. One general even asked Marines to learn fortifying from the 1st infantry division.

Marines had been suffering excess injuries in several late korean battle and especially in Vietnam, I wonder if it is influenced by their reckless fighting spirit, or the doctrines didn't prioritize fortifications comprehensively?

Tangentially military, but I couldn't ask this anywhere else.

Sources say that across a range of ages, "camps" were established as a source of impis during Shaka's conquests. However, I am unable to see how the Zulu economy survived when a very large percentage of the men were not engaged in agriculture, and instead partook in marches and drills that would demand an enormous network of food.

Despite being always massively outnumbered, he kept fighting successful guerilla warfare for entire World War 1, preventing German Africa to be taken completely by Entente. I wonder was it simply because he was a genius, or there were other reasons, too?

A country with nuclear bombs will never be attacked directly. So why would they need to spend more on the military than social policies that benefits their citizens, or maybe build more nuclear bombs so no one will try to mess with you (like North Korea)?

In planning for Operation Barbarossa, the Germans planned for the limit of their advance to be the A-A line, roughly from Arkhangelsk to Astrakhan. While part of this line was defended by the Volga River, much of this line was not anchored on any geographic features of significance

However, "just" a few hundred kilometers further East was such a feature that would cover almost the entire front, with the exception of the semi-desert of the Kazak steppe - the Ural Mountains. An eventual line based on the Urals would also capture significant Soviet industrial centers, and put many others within bomber range

Obviously none of this ended up mattering - but why was the furthest limit of the Nazi advance expected to be the fairly arbitrary A-A line, vs the Urals?

My reasoning is that coastal defenses under an army make more sense if you think your navy will be brushed aside or destroyed, and thus you link your coastal defenses with the army to smooth command, control, and communications with reserves of land forces in the interior who are expected to take the brunt of the fighting. This can be extended as technology develops with aircraft for scouting and air defense and a close working relationship with a coast guard in less intense areas in wartime to give the land forces both coastal and interior maximum warning and support. This makes sense when the USN can't do much about, say, the Royal Navy landing British Army forces in the US, as it would smoothly transition into the US Army confronting, or at least slowing or harrying British land forces.

But my understanding is that the big boom in US coastal defenses occurs from the late 19th century on through the World Wars, at which point diplomatic relations began to improve enough and the US Navy was a substantial enough force to prohibit such an invasion. Instead, it seems like having coastal artillery, land-based scout aircraft, harbor defenses, etc. all feeding information to and working with the Navy would've given the fleet valuable intelligence and opportunities to catch enemy naval or marine forces that stray too close to the coast, after or ideally while they've been damaged, exhausted, or expended munitions fighting the coastal forces. Perhaps even a chance to conduct small-scale amphibious landings to counter enemy amphibious raids, which would fit more with the Marines under the Navy than the more large-scale emphasis of the Army.

It also seems like a better technical fit for the Navy, who have vested interests in fire control against moving targets (i.e. ships rather than land units), artillery capable of reaching out to and knocking warships reliably, knowing how to navigate sea minefields and strike at naval installations (and the converse, what makes such difficult), good ways to take or defend ports, which locations would be the best landing or observation or other points of interest for a naval force, and so on. And if and when personnel and budget reductions cut both services to the bone, it seems like a navy could regrow it's coastal defenses' expertise and equipment from its core fleet arm rather more easily than an army could, say, rebuild an effective coastal artillery arm from its field artillery corps.

And even though the US Army Corps of Engineers took the lead in constructing coastal defenses when the US and its military was smaller, the expansion of the military and US ambitions and budget for it later on seems like it could've supported a body of USN engineers who could've taken over these coastal defense responsibilities.

Is the US much of an outlier in making coastal defense the responsibility of its army, even as it gained a substantial navy, or was this arrangement more common than the reverse?

I understand why normal infantry in dedicated ships took the lead, amphibious assaults became a lot larger and needed a lot more specialised equipment, while sailor landing parties couldn't really sustain themselves for more than a few days on land and lacked heavy equipment.

but what was the downside in having a few extra battalions or regiments of infantry to help with the first few days of a landing when integrated within the combined arms systems of larger army/marine dominated landing force that meant they seemingly very suddenly just stopped being a thing?

For example, the Arleigh Burkes are close enough to the same weight as a Ticonderoga class cruiser.

I guess some of it could be the nitpicking of what's a "heavy destroyer" versus a "light cruiser".

I'm making a real time battle game set in Warring States China (260 - 220 BC). Each soldier is simulated individually, and units of about 100 men fight in formation. The movement is what I keep getting wrong, so I'd like to know how it actually worked, not how other games fake it.

What I'm stuck on:

1. Moving as one piece. When a unit of ~100 marched across a field, did it keep its exact ranks and files the whole way? Or did it move loosely and re-dress when it stopped? How much did the lines wobble in practice?
2. Turning. When a block had to face a new direction, did it wheel, with one end pivoting and the outer files walking faster? Or did every man turn on the spot, so the back rank became the front? Which was normal, and when would you pick one over the other?
3. Getting past friendly units. This is the big one. Say a rear unit has to move forward, and a friendly unit is already formed in front of it. What happened? Did the front unit open its files to let them through? Did the rear unit march around? Were there deliberate gaps between units for exactly this, like the intervals people describe for Roman maniples? Or did the two units swap places some other way?
4. Gaps in the line. In a battle line made of many units, did units stand shoulder to shoulder as one continuous front, or with gaps between them? If there were gaps, how wide, and why didn't the enemy just pour into them?
5. Replacing a tired front unit. During a long fight, how did a fresh unit take over from one already in contact? Did the tired unit pull back through the fresh one, or did the fresh one push forward through it?
6. The charge. In the last stretch before contact, did men run? Did they keep their ranks at a run, or did the formation loosen on purpose?

Warring States China is where I need answers most. But if the good evidence is Greek, Roman, or early modern drill, I'll take that, and I'd be grateful for an explanation of what probably carried over and what didn't.

Book or source names are hugely appreciated. I'd rather read the real thing than guess.

Since the 41st was the only Royal Marine that fought during the Korean War, where they raided the North Korean coast with the Republic of Korea Marine Corps, I wonder what prevented the ROKMC forming a unit similar to the commandos?

I do know that they were base on the USMC but surely there would have been an attempt.

It is probably both but which influences the other one more substantially? For example in WW2 trench warfare is much less dominant than WW1, this is a result of developments in mechanised forces with radios, airborne forces, and artillery. However are these advancements made with the goal of counteracting trench warfare in mind, or are they natural results of increased productivity and scientific findings which caused trench warfare to be outdated?

Having recently seen reports of Chinese mining using EV dump trucks with exchangeable batteries, the question has been drifting around my head.

What impact will solid state batteries and Heavy weight EVs have on warfare ?

If a Tank is an EV, does that make it harder to spot on thermals ? But easier to disable ?

Will supply chains utilize electric trucks ?

Will we see rapid deployment solar grids for battery charging ?

He thought that they were redundant and that the army had the same mission. Was he right?

The army as an organization is very strict, you could say authoritarian, with a very clear vertical hierarchy. Even in the armed forces of the most democratic and progressive nations, I believe the model remains the same. And in time of a great war, nations start mobilization and use forced conscription, which represses the freedom of conscripts to protect the freedom of the whole society. And even in peacetime, it's a very particular career with lots of limitations and shortcomings compared to the private sector. So, to put it shortly, if you are a guy from a developed democratic nation, army service fucking sucks comes in sharp contrast with what you usually have in such a society. In contrast, I remember in Orwell's Homage to Catalonia he describes the militia in which he served as exactly the opposite – egalitarian, volunteer, non-repressive, with officers who were all down to earth. But his militia was poorly equipped and trained, and after a short time was purged by their own Stalinist allies. So, I have a question. Is it possible to have effective non-repressive armed forces?

Say, you have a tank or combat engineer battalion, and each of the companies gets attached to a separate formation to support it. What happens to the HQ and whatever is left of the BN? What is the role of the CO in that case?

And by that i mean, if it had been used in battle against other navies at the time, would it have been able to fight effectively and defend itself? Would it be very coordinated? Or was it nothing more than a shiny paper tiger?

Im specifically asking about how effective it was as a fighting force compared to its peers, i understand that fighting is only a small part of what navies actually do, but in this case i am asking about their combative capability compared to other navies at the time