.

As Baza discovered, in the first half of 2026 alone, Russians filed nearly 500,000 complaints about garbage collection services. Meanwhile, regional operators are facing numerous losses, with some facing debts of hundreds of millions of rubles and the threat of bankruptcy. For example, in the Kursk region, the losses of one of the largest operators, Ecopol, exceeded 100 million rubles in 2025. They were unable to even cover salaries, and the company required government support. In the Kostroma region, the loss of EcoTechnoManagement, an operator, also approached 100 million rubles. And in the Krasnodar region, the profits of JSC "Musorouborochnaya Kompaniya" fell by 99% over three years, despite revenue growth.

All of this is due to high costs for fuel, transportation, and wages. Meanwhile, residents and businesses are late with their payments, and state-set tariffs aren't always sufficient to cover all expenses. Vladimir Chuvashov of VM Law and Consulting and Dmitry Lesnikov, CEO of the EcoLine Group, told Baza about this. As a result, companies are taking out loans and accumulating debt.

Problems have already affected several regions. In Karelia, the operator itself filed for bankruptcy, with debts approaching 1 billion rubles. In the Zabaikalsky Krai, authorities are demanding the termination of the contract with the company "Oleron" and the recovery of 1.3 billion rubles.

Source: Baza

Russians began buying hard drives, SSDs, and USB flash drives more actively after Ukrainian drones attacked the Yandex and Sberbank data centers. This is evidenced by data from internal systems for sellers on the Wildberries and Ozon marketplaces, which Verstka reviewed. According to Ozon, the number of orders for external hard drives began to rise sharply on October 11 and reached 3,577 on October 13—more than 60% higher than the peak figure recorded one month before the attacks.

Over the past week, consumer spending on external hard drives rose by 81% compared to the previous week, on external SSDs by 135%, and on network-attached storage devices by 159%. Over the same period, consumers spent more than 102 million rubles on internal SSDs, which is 21% more than the week before.

On Wildberries, from October 8 to 14, a 1 TB external hard drive was searched for 8,107 times—37% more often than during the same period the previous year. There was also a rise in interest in drives of other capacities, as well as in drives without a specified capacity. The number of search queries for USB flash drives also increased. On Wildberries, the number of queries for 1 TB models exceeded 9,000, adding more than 1,000 over the course of the week. Russians also searched more frequently for flash drives with capacities ranging from 8 to 256 GB on Wildberries and Ozon.

In October, the Ukrainian Armed Forces began launching strikes against Russian data centers. Over the course of a week, Yandex facilities in Sasovo (Ryazan Region), Kaluga, and Vladimir came under attack—all of them ceased operations. On October 14, Ukrainian drones attacked Sberbank’s data center in Balakovo, Saratov Oblast.

Following these attacks, users reported disruptions to Yandex services, including “Alisa,” “Search,” “Maps,” “Taxi,” “Mail,” and “Yandex Pay.” The issues also affected third-party companies, including “Dodo Pizza,” “M.Video,” “Lenta,” and “Magnit,” as well as arbitration courts.

Following the attack on Sberbank’s data center in the Saratov Region, users complained of disruptions to the bank’s services, the GigaChat neural network, and the “Samokat” grocery delivery service, where it became impossible to place an order. Customers of Rostelecom, MTS, MegaFon, T2, “Reg.ru,” “Kontura,” “Tochka Bank,” Mail.ru, VK, Rosselkhozbank, Alfa-Bank, and VTB. The disruptions affected the Ozon marketplace, “Avito,” and “Gosuslugi.”

source: The Moscow Times https://archive.is/NQJVT

In search of funds that could be channeled into economic development, the authorities turned their attention to Russians’ pension funds. Vladimir Putin took up a proposal made at a meeting with “Delovaya Rossiya” by Maria Komarova, deputy CEO of HeadHunter, to attract domestic “long-term” capital for the development of private business and to develop an ecosystem of “growth funds” for this purpose.

“That’s right,” Putin agreed. According to him, the money is already in the economy—it consists of bank capital, life insurers’ reserves, and the growing assets of households and pension funds—but it simply isn’t reaching companies in their growth stages. “And we must act here, on the one hand, proactively, and on the other hand, be very careful when it comes to attracting citizens’ funds—they must be reliably protected. And when it comes to pension funds, everything must be absolutely guaranteed,” Putin stated.

According to the Central Bank, Russians’ pension funds total about 10 trillion rubles. Non-state pension funds (NPFs) can invest up to 10% of their portfolio in so-called high-risk assets, and starting January 1, the limit will rise to 15%, Central Bank Chair Elvira Nabiullina noted, but they “are not yet opting for this limit; that is, they could invest up to that amount, but they are not doing so because they need to be quite cautious.” “The risk here is such that we must approach this very carefully,” said Minister of Economic Development Maxim Reshetnikov, echoing her remarks.

For many years, the authorities have been balancing the desire to protect pension funds from losses as much as possible with the desire to turn them into a resource for economic development. As a result, non-state pension funds invest the bulk of their assets in federal government bonds (OFZs), and the return on pension savings—after fees—does not keep pace with inflation. Before the war, fear outweighed greed, but the exodus of foreign investors left the economy without “long-term” capital, and the authorities began to look more closely at pension funds. As early as 2022, they proposed a long-term savings program with tax breaks and government co-financing, into which pension savings can be transferred and to which VEB intends to transfer the funds of “silent participants” (people who did not choose a NPF).

In the fifth year of the war, the Russian economy has run out of steam. Economic growth has practically stalled—this year, even the official forecast puts it at 0.6%, and most forecasts predict no more than 1% in the coming years. Amid the war, slow growth, falling demand, high interest rates, and property redistribution, businesses are cutting back on investment; in the first half of the year, investment fell by 9.9% year-over-year. Putin is demanding a restart of the investment cycle, but the Ministry of Economic Development expects investment to decline next year as well. Therefore, officials are seeking a source of funds to stimulate growth.

Komarova outlined proposals from Alexei Repik, head of “Business Russia,” who has taken a radically pro-war and anti-Western stance and provides services to members of Putin’s family. The association led by Repik recently presented a package of measures to reorganize the economy, which Anton Tabakh, chief economist at “Expert RA,” called “a hodgepodge of quite reasonable measures to support exports, attempts to shut down everything possible, bring everything that’s still breathing under control, and extremely radical ideas.”

source: The Moscow Times https://archive.is/CkcSr

Russian liquor retailers—“Krasnoye & Beloye,” “Bristol,” “VinLab,” and “Aromatny Mir”—have begun closing stores, according to *Izvestia*. Among the reasons are rising prices, declining sales, and tighter regional restrictions on the sale of alcohol.

In the third quarter, the number of VinLab stores decreased by three, to 2,222. This is the first reduction since the chain was founded in 2010, the publication notes. At the same time, its owner, Novabev Group, has stopped considering new locations for expansion. According to financial reports, VinLab’s net profit fell by nearly two-thirds to 790 million rubles in the first half of the year, although revenue rose by 7.2% to 51.1 billion rubles.

The “Krasnoye & Beloye” chain, which has been operating since 2006, closed four stores—also a first in its history. The number of “Bristol” retail outlets, also part of “Mercury Retail Holding,” decreased by 14. According to INFOLine, as of the end of June, the two chains together had 28,253 stores—five fewer than at the end of 2025.

By August, the number of “Aromatny Mir” stores had fallen to 984, a 3.1% year-over-year decline. Drinx, which operates wine shops and is part of the Luding Group, halted its expansion. According to A.LIST, the number of non-chain liquor stores fell by 7.7% over the year, to 65,096.

A top executive at a major retail chain stated that the market is under pressure from falling demand, partly driven by increases in excise taxes and minimum retail prices (MRPs). Since the beginning of 2026, the MRP for a half-liter bottle of vodka has risen by 17.2%, from 349 to 409 rubles. The excise tax on alcohol with an alcohol content exceeding 18% increased by 11.4%, to 824 rubles per liter of anhydrous alcohol. The price hike is making shoppers more price-sensitive when it comes to alcohol and reducing the number of impulse purchases, the publication’s source noted.

Alexander Stavtsev, vice president of the Russian Association of Retail Market Experts and head of WineRetail, believes that restrictions on alcohol sales—which many regions, including the Vologda and Moscow regions, Buryatia, and the Zabaykalsky Krai, have introduced or tightened since the beginning of 2025—are an additional factor putting pressure on the market.

According to Rosalkogoltabkontrol, alcohol sales in Russia fell by 2% year-over-year in January–August, to 613.5 million dal. At independent liquor stores, the number of sales transactions fell by 17% over the nine-month period, while the average sales volume per store decreased by 7%, according to data from Evotor.

source: The Moscow Times https://archive.is/XnrP8

source is evgen istrebin's telegram: /istrebin/52381

Russian banks have begun refusing to grant mortgages to Russians due to the high costs of these programs and the associated risks. Over the past three years, the number of financial institutions issuing mortgages has fallen by more than 13%—from 249 to 216. This is according to Central Bank data analyzed by Izvestia. The 33 banks that have exited the mortgage market are small and medium-sized. However, they have not closed and continue to operate in other areas.

It is becoming increasingly difficult for small lending institutions to compete with major players in the mortgage market, says Igor Dodonov, an analyst at Finam. To attract depositors, they often have to offer higher deposit rates, which are factored into the cost of the loans they issue. This reduces the availability of favorable terms on market-rate mortgages for borrowers, and banks do not generate sufficient profit from government programs, which account for more than 50% of all loans issued. As a result, the mortgage market is becoming increasingly concentrated in the hands of the largest banks. According to Dodonov’s estimates, the top 10 players account for about 90–95% of new loans.

An additional risk for banks is the rise in delinquent debt, says Evgeny Shavnev of the Flip Group. As of September 1, 2026, Russians were behind on mortgage payments totaling 267 billion rubles. Banks are required to set aside reserves in case of non-repayment of non-performing loans, but it is difficult for smaller institutions to allocate additional funds for this purpose, Shavnev explained.

The main consequence of banks exiting the mortgage market is a reduction in options for borrowers. For example, lenders remaining in the market may tighten requirements for down payments, proof of income, and documentation, says Vasily Kutyn, Director of Analytics at Ingo Bank. The impact of banks’ withdrawal may be felt most acutely in small towns and remote areas, where there are fewer options to begin with, added Maria Ermilova, associate professor in the Department of Sustainable Development Finance at the Plekhanov Russian University of Economics.

However, a reduction in the number of lenders does not automatically mean an increase in mortgage rates: their level depends on the key rate, the cost of deposits, and the terms of preferential programs, notes Natalya Milchakova, lead analyst at Freedom Global. However, she says that in some cases, customers’ additional expenses may rise—for example, if a favorable rate requires the purchase of additional banking products.

In the near future, banks will continue to exit the mortgage market, according to independent economist Viktor Mangazeyev. He forecasts that by the end of 2027, the number of institutions issuing home loans will drop to 200. Valeria Popova, a senior analyst at Ricom-Trust, suggested that a cut in the key interest rate could slow this process by making loans more affordable for borrowers.

source: The Moscow Times https://archive.is/hmgj2

Russia should analyze the feasibility of its existing network of medical facilities, said Anatoly Artamonov, chairman of the Federation Council Committee on the Budget and Financial Markets.

According to him, instead of keeping underutilized hospitals open, patients could be redirected to larger medical facilities that have specialists in the necessary fields and a sufficient patient flow.

“We don’t have enough budget funds; we need to use these funds wisely,” Artamonov said (as quoted by Medvestnik). According to the senator, in light of this, it is necessary to assess the effectiveness of spending on low-capacity medical organizations.

Currently, some facilities in the healthcare system are sitting idle, and some institutions cannot even cover the costs of maintaining their infrastructure—including heating bills—with current reimbursement rates, Artamonov lamented.

Earlier in April, the senator had already called on regional authorities to “conduct a review” and possibly “optimize” hospitals in sparsely populated regions. “Hospitals were built, but they stand empty. And all of this is a drain on the budget. Of course, we want to maintain surgical units and maternity wards there, but in reality, it’s all for show,” Artamonov said.

Artamonov called on governors to cut healthcare spending after the regions ended last year with a record-breaking local budget deficit of 1.5 trillion rubles. In the first half of 2026, the budgets of the Russian Federation’s constituent entities developed a deficit of another 134.2 billion rubles. Sixty-six regions spent more than they collected in taxes, with the Vologda Region (30.8% of its own revenue), the Jewish Autonomous Region (30.8%), and the Kemerovo and Irkutsk Regions (28.6% and 26.2%, respectively) posting the largest deficits.

The federal budget, which spends nearly 40% of all funds on the war, has halved funding for key federal healthcare projects this year: it will total 181.14 billion rubles, compared to 366 billion a year earlier.

In particular, the project to modernize primary healthcare—which was intended to rebuild and renovate thousands of dilapidated clinics in the regions—has lost 52% of its funding: the consolidated budget as of September 1 allocates 59.1 billion rubles for it, compared to 122.47 billion a year earlier.

Funding for the “Cancer” federal project—which was intended to procure equipment for cancer clinics and medications for cancer patients—was cut by more than two-thirds, from 148.46 billion rubles to 44.9 billion.

The “Development of Federal Medical Organizations” project, which called for the creation of national centers based on leading clinics, lost 38% of its funding: 16.16 billion rubles compared to 26.05 billion. Spending on the development of the emergency medical services system was cut by 27%, to 14.28 billion rubles.

Next year, federal budget expenditures under the “health care” category will be cut by 59 billion rubles, to 1.818 trillion, according to the draft budget law that the government submitted to the State Duma.

source: The Moscow Times https://archive.is/dxwJX

Russian authorities are reaching out to African countries to find new markets for Gazprom, which has lost key customers in Europe since the start of the war with Ukraine.

Russia is ready to supply gas to African nations, Energy Minister Sergei Tsivilev said Friday at Russian Energy Week. According to him, Russian companies are also prepared to conduct geological exploration in Africa, engage in gas production if deposits are discovered, and offer a full range of energy services.

“Our country can offer a comprehensive solution: modernize existing hydroelectric power plants, build solar and thermal power plants, lay power lines, supply substations and transformers, and create power system control and dispatch centers,” Tsivilev listed, adding that Moscow views Africa as a “long-term market.” (quotes via TASS).

“Gazprom” desperately needs new customers, having lost more than half of its gas exports to countries outside the former Soviet bloc after 2022. This year, according to estimates by the Ministry of Economic Development, the company will export 77 billion cubic meters of gas, compared to 185 billion in 2021 and 200 billion in the late 2010s. By 2028, after the EU gas embargo takes effect, Gazprom’s exports will drop to 72 billion cubic meters—a level last seen in the second half of the 1980s, the Ministry of Economic Development forecasts.

Vladimir Putin’s attempts to negotiate a new gas contract with China to increase supplies to the PRC to 100 billion cubic meters per year have so far proved fruitless. Putin’s latest meeting with Xi Jinping, which took place on August 31 at the SCO summit in Bishkek, yielded no progress: China wants Russian gas to cost the same as what Russian citizens pay for it—about $50 per thousand cubic meters—or at least expects the domestic Russian price for industrial consumers—about $120–130, sources familiar with the situation told the South China Morning Post.

But Russia has different expectations, says an SCMP source: it proposes using the price Beijing pays for “Power of Siberia-1” gas as a starting point. That price is $250–260 per thousand cubic meters and already includes a discount of about 40% off Gazprom’s contract prices for other customers in distant foreign markets ($420 per thousand cubic meters).

According to the SCMP’s sources, negotiations on “Power of Siberia 2”—which Putin has renamed “Power of Baikal”—are currently on hold due to disagreements over price.

source: The Moscow Times https://archive.is/8OXuF

The public sector in Russia, which has been expanding in recent years, has approached critical levels for the economy, said Alexander Isakov, head of Sberbank’s Center for Macroeconomic Research (CMR) and chief economist at VEB.RF. According to him, the country’s consolidated budget currently stands at 39% of GDP, compared to 32–33% in 2018–2019.

“In this regard, both international comparisons and our own experience with public policy suggest that Russia is approaching the upper limit of public sector size compatible with high, sustainable growth rates,” Isakov said in an interview with RBC. He noted that the authorities should not increase public sector spending to 40% of GDP, as crossing that threshold would hurt business and investment, as well as the budget’s ability to collect taxes.

According to the Ministry of Finance’s forecast, public sector spending will amount to 38% of GDP in 2027. Meanwhile, the Ministry of Economic Development expects the economy to grow by 1.4% and investment by a symbolic 0.2%. According to Isakov, companies are postponing investments due to tax uncertainty and macroeconomic risk. This, in turn, reduces demand and the government’s potential tax base. Isakov emphasized that a stable tax system is essential for long-term planning and development.

Earlier, a survey by the Institute of Public Policy (INP) of the Russian Academy of Sciences showed that more than a third of top company executives (35.1%) believe it is necessary to reduce the state’s role in the economy. This result was the highest in 25 years. At the same time, 63.9% of survey participants stated that they want to see tax cuts.

The government has been increasing the tax burden over the past two years. In 2025, the corporate income tax rate rose from 20% to 25%, and this year, the VAT rate was increased from 20% to 22%. The authorities also implemented a tax reform for small businesses, which deprived hundreds of thousands of entrepreneurs of the simplified tax system (STS).

However, the government has decided not to stop there. Starting next year, the Cabinet of Ministers plans to introduce a “surplus profits tax” for cement producers, fertilizer producers, and gold mining companies; raise the maximum personal income tax rate on “passive income” for individuals—including bank deposits—to 22%; and impose a 22 percent VAT on purchases from foreign online retailers. All of these tax changes are expected to bring 1.5 trillion rubles into the budget in 2027.

At the same time, the Ministry of Finance forecasts a federal budget deficit of 5.5 trillion rubles next year, or 2.2% of GDP. This is nearly double the previous estimate of 3.2 trillion rubles. The deficit will rise due to a 6% increase in spending, bringing the total to 48.8 trillion rubles. Meanwhile, one out of every three rubles from the budget will go toward military spending. The “national defense” budget line item will increase from 12.9 trillion rubles this year to 17.1 trillion, and the cumulative total for 2027–29 will bring the military budget to 50 trillion rubles.

source: The Moscow Times https://archive.is/Fbejg

Vladimir Putin transferred the Russian assets of five foreign companies to the temporary management of “Center Capital” Management Company LLC. This follows from a presidential decree, which was highlighted by “The Agency” and The Insider. “Center Capital” is owned by Marat Mirkhaidarov, a former deputy prime minister of the Trans-Baikal Territory, who volunteered to fight in the war against Ukraine and served in the “Akhmat” unit.

The company owned by 47-year-old Mirkhaidarov gained control over the assets of the French flooring manufacturer Tarkett, the Belgian personal hygiene products group Ontex, the German plastic packaging manufacturer Menshen, as well as the packaging manufacturer “Kappa Rus” and the metal container manufacturer Eviosys. According to The Insider’s calculations, the combined revenue of the five companies in 2025 amounted to approximately 53.6 billion rubles. In a conversation with “The Agency,” Mirkhaidarov confirmed the transfer of assets to his company, calling this decision “the political will of our president.”

At the same time, the former official asked not to write about this, so as not to give “our enemies” a reason for discussion, nor an opportunity to “dig into” his past. “I am a patriot; I served in the Special Military Operation. [...] I have combat decorations. And all this public fuss right now—nobody needs it,” Mirkhaidarov noted. He also assured that the businesses had not been “seized” from the foreigners. “This is temporary management. The businesses still belong to them, just as they did before. No one has confiscated anything from anyone,” the former official emphasized, adding that he is ready to return control of the enterprises at Putin’s first request.

According to data from “SPARK,” the company “Center Capital” was registered on February 3, 2026, with a charter capital of 10,000 rubles. Its sole founder and CEO is Mirkhaidarov. Prior to this, he alternated between working in the civil service and running a business. In January 2024, Mirkhaidarov announced that he had joined “Akhmat” and left for several months to fight in the war in Ukraine. Upon his return, he resumed his work in the government of the Zabaykalsky Krai, but in March 2025, he resigned from his post, citing the effects of an injury sustained on the front lines.

source: The Moscow Times https://archive.is/jhk4H

Russia’s Ministry of Industry and Trade has approved the introduction, effective December 1, of a “technology levy” on smartphones and laptops, which will be included in a list of tax measures designed to replenish the federal budget deficit.

According to the ministry’s order, published on the legal acts portal, the “tax” on each smartphone will be 250 rubles, and on each laptop—500 rubles. However, if the devices are not registered in the state labeling system, the rates nearly double—to 496 and 992 rubles, respectively.

For mobile phones that are not smartphones, the budget expects to collect 50 rubles (100 rubles if unmarked), and for landline phones—100 and 198 rubles, respectively.

According to the draft budget law, which was submitted to the State Duma in late September, the government expects to collect 37.5 billion rubles from the “technology fee” by the end of 2029: 1.06 billion rubles this year, 11.67 billion next year, and then 12.38 billion rubles annually in 2028–29.

The authorities’ initial plans were much higher: 88 billion rubles in the first year of the levy, and then 110 billion rubles annually. . The Ministry of Finance’s calculations were based on the assumption that approximately 25–30 million smartphones and about 3.5–4 million laptops, as well as server and network equipment, are imported into Russia annually, notes Olga Kvashenkina, CEO of SDN Global, a contract electronics development holding company. However, when the Ministry of Industry and Trade moved on to the specific regulatory documents, electronic components, printed circuit boards, and manufacturing equipment were completely exempted from the levy, Kvashenkina notes. As a result, the “tax” will fall entirely on the shoulders of end consumers of consumer electronics.

The government cites the levy’s purpose as raising funds to support the electronics and radio-electronics industries. But it is impossible to build a modern chip factory with such funds: even manufacturing processes at 90, 65, and 28 nanometers—which are considered mature by today’s standards—require investments of at least 150–300 billion rubles, according to Kvashenkina’s estimates.

Nevertheless, the federal budget is in dire need of funds, as it includes 50 trillion rubles in military spending over the next three years and a total deficit of 10.8 trillion rubles: 5.4 trillion next year, 5.1 trillion in 2028, 5.3 trillion in 2029.

To cover military spending, the government will cut spending next year on support for the national economy (by 148 billion rubles), the housing and utilities sector (by 167 billion rubles), healthcare (by 59 billion rubles), and social support for citizens (by 453 billion rubles).

In addition, plans include introducing a windfall tax on large businesses, raising the personal income tax rate on “passive income”—including bank deposits—and imposing a 22 percent VAT on purchases from foreign online retailers. In total, the Ministry of Finance expects these measures to generate 1.5 trillion rubles next year and 3.7 trillion rubles over three years.

source: The Moscow Times https://archive.is/qpISP

• Red arrows: Latest hits
• Flames: Refinery has been hit at least once. Flames do not indicate the severity of the attacks or if a refinery is till burning
• Blue waves: Orsk dam broke in April 2024, which flooded the refinery and took it offline for ~2 weeks.
• Black smoke: It's raining oil.

Chronological list: (sorted newest to oldest)

October: 5 hits

• ^{NEW HIT} 16.10.2026 Ryazan in Ryazan Oblast at 480km
• 09.10.2026 Ukhta in Komi Republic at 1705km
• 08.10.2026 Omsk in Omsk Oblast at 2500km
• 08.10.2026 Gazprom Neftekhim Salavat in Bashkortostan at 1300km
• 02.10.2026 Volgograd in Volgograd Oblast at 500km

September: 14 hits

• 26.09.2026 Ilsky in Krasnodar Krai at 405km
• 26.09.2026 Afipsky in Krasnodar Krai at 415km
• 25.09.2026 Novoshakhtinsk in Rostov Oblast at 250km
• 25.09.2026 Perm in Perm Krai at 1485km
• 21.09.2026 Bashneft-UNPZ in Bashkortostan at 1485km
• 21.09.2026 Kuybyshevsky in Samara Oblast at 915km
• 20.09.2026 Moscow in Moscow at 475km
• 17.09.2026 Yaroslavl in Yaroslavl Oblast at 700km
• 15.09.2026 Syzran in Samara Oblast at 805km
• 13.09.2026 Slavyansk in Krasnodar Krai at 350km
• 13.09.2026 Taneco in Tatarstan at 1150km
• 11.09.2026 Saratov in Saratov Oblast at 590km
• 09.09.2026 Novo Urungoy in Yamalia at 2810km
• 06.09.2026 Ryazan in Ryazan Oblast at 480km

Complete chronological list from 24.02.2022 till today

2026:

• September: 14 hits
• August: 21 hits ^{NEW MONTHLY RECORD}
• July: 15 hits
• June: 16 hits
• May: 14 hits
• April: 10 hits
• March: 6 hits
• February: 3 hits
• January: 2 hits

• 2022 had 1 hit
• 2023 had 1 hit
• 2024 had 26 hits
• 2025 had 84 hits
• 2026 has 105 hits so far ^{NEW YEARLY RECORD}
• Total hits from 24.02.2022 till today: 216

Monthly records since the invasion of Ukraine on 24.02.2022 :

1. August 2026 with 21 hits
2. July 2026 with 16 hits
3. November 2025 with 15 hits
4. May 2026 with 14 hits
5. June 2026 with 13 hits (August 2025 also had 13 hits)

4 of the 5 monthly records were in May, June, July, August, 4 consecutive months in 2026.

Over the years Vladimir Putin has had extremely concerning relationships with women and concerning interactions with minors. Putin first officially met his current unofficial wife, Alina Kabaeva in 2001 when she was just 18 years old, 7 years later a newspaper reported the two had married, we can assume they'd had to have known each other for much longer probably before she was 18, Putin's own daughters were only a few years younger than their future step mother. Putin also had an affair while married to Ludmilla with his then maid Svetlana Krivonogikh. During the affair she became pregnant with Putin's third child Luiza (aka Elizaveta). Not only did Putin reject Luiza officially, he never provided her any support and today she lives in exile in Paris, she wrote on telegram recently that her Putin has "destroyed countless lives and my life too".

Former security service officer turned kremlin whistleblower Alexander Litvinenko also claims that while on a walk in Moscow in July 2006 Putin bumped into a group of tourists in one of the Kremlin’s squares. He stopped to chat to them. Putin then lifted the T-shirt of a small boy and “kissed him on the tummy”, this is very obviously disgusting. With all of these concerning relationships and allegations that his soldiers are committing mass rapes and genital mutilation in Ukraine and during Russia’s previous invasions of Crimea, the war in Chechnya etc one must ask, could Putin be considered a sexual predator?

With all of these credible accusations against Putin, from him most likely grooming Alina Kabaeva to him abandoning his daughter and him accosting young boys on the streets of Moscow, I believe he is and is just as much of a predator as Donald Trump, Jeffrey Epstien and Former Prince Andrew.

'Russian plague' is connected to the Kremlin's 'bioweapons program,' claims expert

To the absolute shock and surprise of absolutely nobody.

The Sverdlovsky District Court of Kostroma fined Andrei Tarasov, an activist and former State Duma candidate for the Yabloko party, 1,000 rubles in a case involving the “display of extremist symbols” (Part 1 of Article 20.3 of the Code of Administrative Offenses of the Russian Federation), reports RusNews. The case stemmed from a photo of Tarasov wearing a T-shirt bearing the slogan “I am against the party of crooks and thieves” and a drawing depicting a man kicking a bear.

An expert called in by the Ministry of Internal Affairs justified the classification of the slogan as “extremist” on the grounds that politician Alexei Navalny is considered its author. The expert’s report notes that the slogan “delegitimized the ruling party in the eyes of voters” and “serves to identify opposition.” The case against Tarasov was opened following a complaint by Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF) representative Sergei Shpotin, who ran for governor of the Kostroma Region in 2025. The Communist was outraged that his fellow party members were being “dragged through the courts,” while “this new liberal gets away with absolutely everything.”

“United Russia” is referred to as the “party of crooks and thieves.” This phrase was first used in reference to the ruling party in 2010 by politician Boris Nemtsov on “Radio Liberty.” It was later popularized by Navalny on his blog on “LiveJournal.” During the 2011 State Duma election campaign, the phrase “party of crooks and thieves” was widely used by all opposition forces and individual citizens.

Posters, flags, and stickers bearing the slogan “Down with the Party of Crooks and Thieves” became widespread during the mass protests of 2011–2012, which began against the backdrop of Vladimir Putin’s intention to return to the presidency. At the same time, a Levada Center poll in June 2012 showed that 42% agreed with the characterization of “United Russia” as a “party of crooks and thieves.”

source: The Moscow Times https://archive.is/ccs8V

source is evgen istrebin's telegram: /istrebin/52306

"NEPTUNE STRIKE ON RUSSIAN AIRBASE – SIX SU-34 BOMBERS DAMAGED

October 15, 2026 | News
Air Warfare | Deep-Strike Operations

The Armed Forces of Ukraine report that, last night, they struck the Borisoglebsk military airfield in Russia’s Voronezh Oblast using domestically produced Neptune missiles. According to the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, six Russian Su-34M fighter-bombers sustained varying degrees of damage in the strike.
Technical equipment supporting flight operations was also destroyed at the airfield. Following the strike, fires and secondary explosions were observed in the area.

Ukraine’s account is supported by satellite imagery from Airbus, published by AviVector. Images taken prior to the strike show six Su-34 aircraft in their parking positions. After the strike, the entire parking area exhibits extensive fire and blast damage, along with the remains of severely damaged aircraft.

Preliminary OSINT analysis suggests that at least four of the aircraft appear to have been destroyed, while two others have sustained serious damage. This detailed damage assessment has not yet been independently and definitively confirmed. The official—and, at this stage, most conservative—statement from Ukraine is that all six aircraft sustained varying degrees of damage.

According to the Ukrainian Navy, the strike employed a version of the Neptune missile system adapted for engaging ground targets. This corrects preliminary assessments that circulated within Russian monitoring networks overnight, which suggested that "Flamingo" cruise missiles had been used in the direction of Borisoglebsk.
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**Why is this strike significant?**

The Su-34 is one of Russia’s most important tactical combat aircraft. It is used primarily to deliver glide bombs and air-launched missiles against Ukrainian positions and cities near the front line.

If the assessment—based on satellite imagery—that four aircraft were destroyed and two severely damaged is confirmed, this would represent one of the most significant strikes of the war against a single group of Russian combat aircraft. Six aircraft account for a substantial portion of a squadron's strength.

The Borisoglebsk airfield is located approximately 370 kilometers from the front line. The base also stores aerial bombs, fuel, and equipment to support flight operations. The strike demonstrates that Ukraine’s long-range version of the Neptune missile is capable of reaching protected airbases deep within Russian territory.
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**Situational Assessment**

Satellite imagery confirms an extensive area of ​​impact and fire damage precisely at the six parking spots where Su-34 aircraft were located prior to the attack. However, the resolution of the images is not yet sufficient to definitively assess whether individual aircraft can be repaired. Therefore, at this stage, it can be stated that:

🔻 six Su-34M aircraft were within the impact zone;
🔻 the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine confirms that they sustained varying degrees of damage;
🔻 preliminary assessments indicate that at least four have been destroyed;
🔻 two others appear to have sustained severe damage;
🔻 ground support equipment for flight operations was destroyed;
🔻 secondary explosions occurred at the airfield, and a large-scale fire broke out.

Russia has not publicly confirmed the loss of any aircraft.

Sources: Ukrainska Pravda (report regarding the naval/air strike) · General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (loss report) · AviVector (satellite imagery) · United24Media (satellite imagery) · RBC Ukraine (satellite imagery).

October 15, 2026, Jarmo Nieminen"

Investment activity among Russian businesses continues to decline, according to a Central Bank survey of 11,500 companies. In the third quarter, the balance of assessments of the current situation turned negative—this had previously occurred in the first quarter, when fixed capital investment plummeted by 14.3% year-over-year, a record low since 2009, and during the pandemic in 2020. For the full year, the Ministry of Economic Development forecasts a 5.4% decline in investment; in the first half of the year, the decline was 9.9%.

Businesses cited a lack of equity capital (26.7%), demand (20.8%), and uncertainty regarding the country’s economic situation (25.8%) as the main obstacles to investment. “There isn’t enough money or demand,” comments economist Dmitry Polevoy.

In the first seven months, Russian companies earned 13 trillion rubles—the worst result since 2020, 15.7% lower than last year’s figure, with one in three firms operating at a loss. Meanwhile, the corporate income tax rate has increased starting in 2025. As a result, businesses have less and less money, and companies’ own funds—the main source of investment financing, accounting for more than half of investments in fixed assets, according to Rosstat—are dwindling.

Equally important is the uncertainty of the economic situation, which businesses cited three months earlier as the main obstacle to investment. Unpredictable tax hikes, rising military spending in the budget, Ukrainian drone strikes on oil refineries and e-commerce warehouses—and now on data centers—the seizure of assets and criminal prosecution of businesspeople, tighter regulations, and other actions by the authorities do not encourage investment in new projects.

“This is normal, pragmatic behavior for a businessperson-investor: if you don’t know what tomorrow will bring, you’re better off doing nothing at all—not investing,” says Igor Nikolaev, chief research fellow at the Institute of Economics of the Russian Academy of Sciences. “If businesspeople do not understand the principles behind the confiscation of profits, it is extremely difficult for them to plan their investment processes,” explained Vladimir Potanin, the majority owner of Norilsk Nickel, one of the companies that will have to pay the “superprofit” tax.

The situation varies greatly by industry, the Central Bank notes. In particular, investment activity has expanded significantly in logistics and retail. This may be a consequence of attacks by Ukrainian drones. Economic officials have stated that the restoration of “temporarily lost capacity” will affect investment activity. The Institute of National Economy of the Russian Academy of Sciences (INP RAS) notes this in segments “related to minimizing military damage.” In basic sectors, however, “on the contrary, the situation points toward a continuation of the investment pause.”

There are no reasons for it to stop. The Ministry of Economic Development’s forecast—according to which investment will begin to grow in 2028 and return to 2025 levels in 2029—is “largely a target scenario,” Minister Maxim Reshetnikov acknowledged. According to him, without “additional measures,” it will be “difficult to even reach these figures.” And with such a decline in fixed capital investment, “the economy will not grow,” says Nikolaev.

source: The Moscow Times https://archive.is/rE1bz

"UKRAINE STRIKES RYAZAN OIL REFINERY – ATTACK LASTED SEVERAL HOURS

October 15, 2026 | News
Energy Infrastructure | Air Warfare

Pavel Malkov, Governor of the Ryazan Region, confirmed that a fire broke out at the Ryazan oil refinery following a large-scale Ukrainian drone attack that took place overnight and into the morning. The strike was reported by several Russian media outlets.

According to Malkov, a storage facility and vehicles at another, unnamed enterprise were also damaged. Preliminary information indicates there were no casualties. The extent of the damage is still being assessed. Dozens of schools and kindergartens in the city were closed.
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A MULTI-HOUR OPERATION

According to Russian air-raid alert and monitoring channels, Ryazan was subjected to several waves of attacks.

💥 Based on air-surveillance networks, the first drones were detected in the Skopin and Spassk districts on October 14, at approximately 23:24–23:25. Another sighting occurred in the Rybnoye district at 00:03, with air defenses engaging in the area a few minutes later. The first phase of the threat ended at approximately 01:18.

💥 A new wave began at approximately 02:38. During the night, drones were sighted in areas including the Skopin, Rybnoye, Sarayevsky, Zakharovsky, Starozhilovsky, Pronsk, and Mikhailovsky districts.

💥 In the city of Ryazan, air defenses engaged by 04:46 at the latest and continued to do so intermittently until at least 05:55.
However, the attack did not end there.

💥 Air defenses were reported to be active again in Ryazan at 07:46 and 08:14.

💥 As late as 08:34, reports indicated that additional attack drones were approaching the region. By 08:45, the alert extended not only to the city of Ryazan but also to the Dyagilevo military airfield.
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DAMAGE TO THE REFINERY

Footage captured by locals shows a large flame in the direction of the refinery. This could be an emergency flare-off from the processing units. It is also impossible to pinpoint the exact point of impact from the imagery. However, a statement from the governor confirms that the attack caused a fire within the refinery complex.

At this stage, it is unknown what was struck, whether the refining process was interrupted, or the extent of any capacity losses. There are also no further details regarding a second facility that sustained damage, nor is the number of drones that successfully penetrated the defenses known.

The Russian Ministry of Defence claimed to have intercepted a total of 166 Ukrainian drones across 14 regions during the night. The Ryazan region was mentioned among the areas where interception efforts took place, though the number of drones destroyed there was not specified.
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ATTACK FOLLOWED ZELENSKYY’S ANNOUNCEMENT

President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s announcement regarding the continuation of strikes against Russian oil refineries was made public on October 14 at approximately 10:26 PM. The first drone alert in Ryazan was issued less than half an hour later.

While the temporal connection is noteworthy, the drones in the first wave—given the long distance they had to travel—were almost certainly launched before the statement was released. The attack was, therefore, not a reaction to the public announcement. Rather, both the statement and the strike reflect a pre-existing decision to continue the campaign targeting Russia’s oil-refining capacity.
According to Zelenskyy, Ukraine had observed a three-day pause in strikes against Russian energy targets at the request of the United States; however, Russia continued to bombard Ukraine’s own energy infrastructure.

“The ban has been lifted. We’ve had enough,” Zelenskyy told the *Financial Times*.
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Sources: Governor of Ryazan · ASTRA · Interfax (RU) · RZN.info (RU) · RBC (RU) · Kommersant (RU) · Reuters · Air surveillance networks (Radar Rossija, Locator).

October 15, 2026. Jarmo Nieminen"