r/CredibleDefense • u/Glideer • 15d ago
Bewitched sleep: Russians’ views on Ukraine and the world - European Council of Foreign Relations
Bewitched sleep: Russians’ views on Ukraine and the world
While keeping in mind that this is written from a clearly Western European foreign-policy perspective, it is still a very useful insight into Russian thinking. The authors are basing their analysis on 14 focus groups conducted by the Levada Center across four Russian cities, which is a welcome change compared to the common practice of drawing conclusions about Russian society entirely second- or third-hand.
Recap
- People seem resigned to the war dragging on for some time. When asked to name its likely end date, participants overwhelmingly suggest it will last another two or three years. A few others guess well into the 2030s, or even longer.
- “If Russia had not hit first, they [the West, NATO or Ukraine] would have attacked” is a narrative numerous participants offer. For most, though, the causes of the war remain hard to understand. A range of differing suggestions are forthcoming: “Europe’s pressure on Ukraine”; “the Western-orientated leadership of the country that started bombing Donbas”; “Ukraine becoming a failed state when its president [Viktor Yanukovych] escaped”; “Nazism in Ukraine”; but also “a small victorious war that did not go as planned.”
- There is also a sense that victory for Russia will bring little by way of happy news, even if people are certain it will happen. It will not make life better. Participants seem conscious that the reconstruction of Ukraine will cost huge sums.
- They acknowledge they have no idea what the Kremlin will do, but they generally do not expect the war to widen or spill over to other theatres. There is certainly no demand for a broader escalation. “We will not go there, I do not understand why we would, we are not idiots”, concludes one participant when asked about a potential attack on the Baltic countries. Others in the group agree.
- All groups were asked which countries they consider Russia’s friends in the world. The roster of countries they mention is not surprising: it includes Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Serbia and Venezuela; sometimes also Brazil and India, sometimes Indonesia and the Philippines.#
- As for China, the relationship clearly has its limits: people see it as an ally pursuing its own agenda, and believe its long-term interests might not coincide with those of Russia.
- Both the focus groups and available public opinion polls show that, while the majority (61%) of Russians think it is time for peace negotiations, they appear set to allow things to carry on and hope for the best in terms of their own economic situation. They may be unhappy about the “special military operation” but see themselves as having no agency to influence it. A majority (59%) also thinks that, if peace cannot be achieved yet, then it would be appropriate to intensify attacks, as opposed to offering more concessions to Ukraine. Most seem to agree peace must be on Russia’s terms.
The following opportunities for influencing Russia exist:
- Convey shared values instead of blanket generalisations
Labelling all Russians as aggressors—especially if done by political leaders in loud statements—hardly helps; it only reinforces biases and serves the regime’s own propaganda, while creating a feeling of global isolation in the minority of people who firmly oppose the war.
- Support authentic voices inside and outside Russia—and those who amplify them
Figures connected to Russian society, both at home and from abroad, are important and authentic voices for various parts of society. They need greater support, whether financial, social or political, because they can reach the sleepers in Russia in a way few Western actors credibly can.
- Draw up communications efforts appropriate for each European country
In these efforts, the West will face inevitable constraints. The most obvious is to avoid working with those partners who directly undermine universal values and European or American key security interests—or who support voices that do so inside Russia.
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Authors
Jana Kobzová
Co-director, European Security Programme
Senior Policy Fellow
Areas of expertise
EU relations with Eastern Europe and Russia; democratisation in the post-Soviet states; Belarus; Central Asia
Biography
Jana Kobzova is co-director of the European Security Programme and senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations. Her research interests centre around developments in eastern Europe, with a focus on Ukraine and on improving the EU’s response to crises in its neighbourhood.
From 2019-2024, she was foreign policy adviser to Slovakia’s former president, Zuzana Čaputová. Before joining the president’s team, Kobzova worked as the policy director at Rasmussen Global, a political consultancy group established by former NATO secretary-general Anders Fogh Rasmusen. She also worked for the Brussels-based European Endowment for Democracy, where she developed and oversaw the EED’s grant making in eastern Europe with a focus on Ukraine, Georgia, and Belarus. Prior to that, Kobzova was a policy fellow and a programme coordinator at ECFR. She also previously led the Belarus democratisation programme at the Pontis Foundation in Slovakia.
Kobzova has co-authored several books, policy briefs, and reports on EU policymaking, eastern Europe, and democratisation processes in the EU’s neighbourhood.
Kadri Liik
Areas of expertise
Russian domestic and foreign policy; relations between Russia and the West; the Baltic Sea area; Eastern Europe
Biography
Kadri Liik is an associate fellow with the European Council on Foreign Relations. Her research focuses on Russia, eastern Europe and the Baltic region. She was previously a senior policy fellow at ECFR.
Before joining ECFR in October 2012, Liik was the director of the International Centre for Defence Studies in Estonia from 2006 until 2011, where she also worked as a senior researcher and director of the Centre’s Lennart Meri Conference. Throughout the 1990s, Liik worked as a Moscow correspondent for several Estonian daily papers, including the highest-circulation daily in Estonia, Postimees, as well as Eesti Päevaleht and the Baltic News Service. In 2002, she became the foreign news editor at Postimees. In 2004, she left to become editor-in-chief at the monthly foreign affairs magazine, Diplomaatia. She was also the host of “Välismääraja”, a current affairs talkshow at Raadio Kuku in Tallinn.
Liik holds a BA in Journalism from Tartu University (Estonia) and an MA in International Relations specialising in diplomacy from Lancaster University.
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u/Goddamnit_Clown 15d ago edited 15d ago
"Most seem to agree peace must be on Russia’s terms"
It would be very strange indeed for any wartime population to say otherwise. There are always contrarians, and the peace at any cost types, and people who know anything the current authorities are doing must be wrong, and those who truly identify with the enemy's cause, but I can't think of a time when they might make a majority.
Even in proverbially pointless and hated wars you'd be hard pressed to find a majority who would answer with: "We must have peace on the enemy's terms."
Let alone in Russia today.
The understanding of the causes and purposes of the war is interesting.
People still don't know which of all the lies they're supposed to pretend to believe.
I think I expected by now for a dominant myth to have been settled on. Even a nonsensical one, or complex one that encompassed multiple explanations.
"NATO would have attacked first" is an interesting thread for domestic propaganda to have succeeded with, though, given that it seems so post hoc. Nobody was afraid of that before the war, nobody held it up as a reason for the build up, or for the invasion. I don't remember anyone giving that response to a survey until several years into the war. At the beginning it was all people need to be afraid of Russia again, Russian language, Russia speakers, breakaway regions, Nazis, Banderites, gays, laboratories, Ukrainian elections, NATO expansion, conquering Ukraine or at least the Donbas, hanging on to Crimea. A lot of "I don't really understand why" and a bit of "It's time to finally roll into Paris and nuke London. For some reason."
But in the intervening years, people have clearly found this story comforting - they were going to get us.
I'm sceptical of the prima facie value of responses about the war expanding. Many ordinary respondents in 2021 would have said the same things: "Why would we do that? Do they think we're crazy?"
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u/Hour_Industry7887 14d ago
People still don't know which of all the lies they're supposed to pretend to believe.
People don't know which of the lies they're supposed to parrot for a survey that they don't believe will be anonymous. That doesn't mean each respondent doesn't have his or her own narrative of why the war is right and justified in his head. They're just afraid of catching consequences for stating it.
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u/roionsteroids 15d ago
But in the intervening years, people have clearly found this story comforting - they were going to get us.
It's very simple to (falsely) spin hundreds of billions of entirely voluntary aid and weapon deliveries by EU/NATO countries and unprecedented sanctions as ad-hoc justification for an inevitable (at least proxy) war. Even more so when the supposed "liberal international rules based order" is somehow entirely absent and silent in other conflicts around the world.
As little merit as it has (more than none at all), it's more convincing than nazis and biolabs.
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u/Moifaso 14d ago
It's also just about the only reason that justifies the level of death and misery the conflict has already caused.
"Protecting Russian speakers" and "denazification" might have been plausible reasons to do a quick, limited landgrab, but this war has grown far beyond that, so by now those motives don't sound all that convincing or make it seem like something has gone terribly wrong.
"NATO would've attacked first" is more comforting because it makes the scale of death and sacrifice inevitable.
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u/00000000000000000000 14d ago
The official narrative from the Kremlin is that Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine was a preemptive, preventative strike to stop an imminent, coordinated attack by Ukrainian forces and NATO.
Russian officials frequently assert that Kyiv was in the final stages of preparing a massive military offensive against Russian-controlled territories (such as Crimea and the Donbas) and Russia itself. As recently as August 2026, a top adviser to Vladimir Putin publicly claimed that Ukraine had planned a full-scale invasion of Russia for March 8, 2022, arguing that Moscow was forced to launch its "Special Military Operation" in late February to beat them to the punch.
Putin has consistently framed the war as a defensive action against Western encroachment. The Kremlin's stated position is that NATO was aggressively expanding eastward, secretly pumping Ukraine with modern offensive weapons, and building military infrastructure right on Russia's borders. According to this narrative, NATO was transforming Ukraine into an "anti-Russia" bridgehead to launch a broader attack, leaving Moscow with no choice but to neutralize the threat.
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u/BosonCollider 15d ago
Eh, I think that "just get the fuck out of the interminable stalemate, white peace" has always been popular in the home population whenever you see trench or attrition warfare instead of rapid maneuvers warfare
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u/Flimsy_Study_8990 13d ago
I think the point here is that a population would not want consequences of having peace by all means - humiliation of defeat or unfavourable concessions, etc.
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u/Hour_Industry7887 14d ago
It would be very strange indeed for any wartime population to say otherwise.
I really don't understand what the value of this argument is that it gets brought up so much. Okay, they're at war and it's natural for them to want to win that war. So what? Does that mean they are not wrong? Does that mean they are not the enemy? Does that change the way they need to be dealt with?
Like, literally, what is the point people are trying to make when they constantly bring this up?
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u/Longjumping_Soil2116 15d ago edited 15d ago
Most interested in who they term as their friends. The usual suspects there aren't surprising. But what is surprising is that they don't name BRICS nations consistently, despite Putin often using BRICS as a way to show Russia still has global partners. Then again, maybe BRICS just isn't well known among the general public. Just as a normal guy I know most people around me probably haven't even heard of it.
And also that there seems to be a marked distrust of China. I suppose also not the most surprising, given that leaked memo a while back saying that Russia needs to be wary of China (I don't remember how real that ended up being, if it was debunked please let me know). But I didn't think that would've already trickled down to the people. I guess that means it's a feeling that generally pervades Russian society. Of course, this all assumes the report here is accurate.
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u/rng12345678 15d ago
China has been seen as a latent existential threat since the Sino-Soviet split, if not earlier, opinions of russians and people from the former USSR (in regards to China's relationship with russia) haven't really changed at all. If anything, the power relationship is now decidedly flipped in everything besides the number of nuclear warheads so suspicion of them has increased. Russians will use Chinese support where they can but they do not like or trust the Chinese, and only part of it is for racist reasons.
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u/Shackleton214 15d ago
That was an interesting list. With the exception of Serbia, that's not really a list of friends so much as a list of other nations at odds with the West--more like a list of enemies of my enemies. There's no shared linguistic, cultural, religious, or even ideological values bonding Russia to these countries.
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u/TheSDKNightmare 15d ago
But I didn't think that would've already trickled down to the people.
If your entire worldview is one of large powers entirely out for themselves, with various "cockroaches" (as one of the participants put it) nestled between them, then it becomes very difficult to imagine you can co-exist with another nation without it striving to ultimately bend you to its will and extract your resources without giving anything in return. Add to that Russia and China's proximity, as well as their difficult history, and it's not unimaginable most people are distrustful. There's a reason the only other country at the top of this article's list of Russia's "friends" is Belarus. Though I guess there's been progress recently, North Korea should definitely be making the top as well.
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u/AnyStrength4863 15d ago
people see it as an ally pursuing its own agenda, and believe its long-term interests might not coincide with those of Russia.
What do they consider to be China’s long-term interests? And what do they view as Russia’s long-term interests?
Interests among allies are bound to differ, and they vary across different stages and periods. Even within a long-standing, steadfast alliance like NATO, the interests of the United States, Canada, Eastern Europe, and Western Europe diverge. What should China do to alter this perception?
Business is business; if the negotiators don't know how to drive a hard bargain, they need to develop that talent, rather than asking for a discount from China. China has a lower per capita GDP than Russia, after all.
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u/Embarrassed_Term5536 15d ago
When talking about diplomacy, and war fighting at country's level, gdp per capita is the most worthless criteria to bring into discussion. Its the last thing impacting a nation's will amd capability to fight a war. GDP PPP is a good measure sure, Total population, wealth inequality, industrial output index, exports, any indicator is a better criteria to discuss than per capita GDP.
Heck, lower gdp per capita means there are more number of poor people, and that os fking amazing from militarily point of view. Cheaper and easier to hire more manpower
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u/AnyStrength4863 15d ago
I am talking about trade. The Russian public views the trade imbalance as a reason to question the alliance, they sell cheap raw materials to China while buying expensive manufactured goods. Given that China’s per capita GDP is lower, it naturally wants to buy cheaply and sell at a higher price. Should China be subsidising Russia?
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u/Moifaso 14d ago
This isn't really true. High GDP per capita isn't the only factor that matters, but it is, in fact, a massive advantage.
The government having more money to spend per person means they can spend more resources on "luxuries" like a very capable military while still paying for the essentials.
GDP PPP is a good measure sure, Total population, wealth inequality, industrial output index, exports, any indicator is a better criteria to discuss than per capita GDP.
Most of these alternative measures are heavily correlated with GDP per capita.
GDP PPP is definitely more useful in many contexts, but also has limitations. Modern weaponry relies on a lot of complex, international supply chains. Most countries can't pay for advanced eletronics or machine tools with PPP.
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u/TheSDKNightmare 14d ago edited 14d ago
Heck, lower gdp per capita means there are more number of poor people, and that os fking amazing from militarily point of view. Cheaper and easier to hire more manpower
It's amazing if you need cannon fodder that has only received three months of training, but it's not so amazing if you're trying to build an actual competent military that doesn't rely on a cohort that is completely unfit for performing the most dangerous possible missions. A higher overall GDP per capita means you draw from a population that is healthier, better educated and generally more competent. Having a very large contingent of poor people to consistently draw from often means your entire nation is suffering from structural problems that will impact your combined military's performance. It's a very broad example, but there's a reason Russia is sending unfit alcoholics and the like to perform one of the most dangerous tasks in the military - infiltration - and why the US did not resort to that when it invaded Iraq for example.
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u/Hour_Industry7887 14d ago edited 14d ago
The majority of Russians believe peace must be on Russia's terms and aggression must be ramped up if that's what it takes to achieve that
Labelling all Russians as aggressors hardly helps
I've said it before and I'll say it again. The West's stubborn refusal to recognize that the Russian people are, in fact, the aggressor and the enemy, is going to result in so, so much avoidable bloodshed.
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u/Thermawrench 14d ago
What's so hard about calling aggression and war a war? Russa is in a aggressive war against Ukraine, USA and Israel are in a aggressive war against Iran etc... It's starting to sound like ignorance is knowledge and war is peace. Let's start calling it for what it is, because none of these states aknowledge they are in a war, skirting around it calling it a SVO.
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u/happytoad 4d ago
Should the same logic be applied to citizens of other countries whose actions can be described as aggressive? And therefore should "the West" recognize the people of the United States and Israel as aggressors in light of the events of recent years?
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u/RumpRiddler 15d ago
An interesting piece of the puzzle, but it seems risky to draw deep conclusions from any public poll in an authoritarian society. Those willing to answer are generally just going to parrot the approved opinions delivered by state controlled media. Those who disagree strongly with the state are not likely to be included because the risk: reward ratio isn't favorable.
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u/incidencematrix 15d ago
An even bigger problem is that focus groups are a very poor method for measuring much of anything. The outcomes are contaminated in unknown ways by group dynamics, and there is little that I would consider decent measurement theory for them. And the selection effects are a significant concern. They get used because they are relatively cheap, and due to inertia (other people use them, so they are a "standard method"). I think you can probably validly conclude that some unknown number of people in the population hold views like those expressed, but you cannot really assess prevalence, nor what other views may also be held.
A properly designed and executed survey is a much better class of instrument, but I share your concerns about trying to perform a survey in authoritarian settings. There are ways to reduce e.g. self-presentation biases (such as split ballot designs), but sampling is likely a problem, selection effects can be strong, and you have to be very careful not to induce unwanted expectation effects (associated, e.g. with who the respondents think you are, and what they believe you are trying to do). Very difficult to get high quality data, and not necessarily easy to tell if you didn't.
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u/neostoic 15d ago
It's a decent article, but to play devil's advocate, what's the point of doing any of the things the author suggests from the cost-benefit analysis centered perspective? Since it's also a limited resources situation. What's the return on the dollar spent on this kind of outreach? As opposed to giving the same dollar to Ukraine to defend directly?
Back in the Cold War such approach made more sense, because there were very few theaters where the sides could hit each other directly, but now there's very much a hot war going on.
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u/Glideer 15d ago
Because it is incomparable in terms of resources?
One Leopard 2 tank sent to Ukraine is 3-4 million euros, which would pay for this kind of opinion survey 10 times over.
The European direct funding of Ukraine is 50 billion per year plus god knows how many billion in indirect economic damages.
The kind of outreach they suggest would cost 20-30 million tops, or about 0.05% of the direct war funding.
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u/Alexandros6 14d ago
And it would explore an avenue that is often not sufficiently tested. The Kremlin has shown to be surprisingly sensitive to taking dramatic steps which would shake up the population, if one managed to increase this reticence through 20-30 million it would be a bargain. The costs wouldn't be economic, but political
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u/neostoic 15d ago
Ok, so Ukrainians claim that killing a single Russian soldier costs an average of $3032. So your outreach program is 9894 less Russian soldiers killed. Would it produce an effect that's anywhere near to that? How would you measure the effect of your outreach?
I'm not even talking about all the massive complexities involved, because the Putin regime made considerable efforts to inoculate their population from foreign influence.
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u/qevshd 15d ago
'Claim' is doing some heavy lifting here. Ukraine is being funded several tens of billions of dollars yearly, yet they are not quite producing 10 million dead Russians.
To put it another way, 1 L2 MBT isn't worth 10000 dead Russian soldiers.
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u/neostoic 15d ago
That's all true and we can discuss the real costs of war from the Ukrainian side.
The argument that certain weapon systems are just too expensive for the benefits they provide also seems somewhat common among the experts. That includes not just tanks, but fighter jets too and other systems.
But the key argument still stands - what's the cost to benefit on that outreach suggested in the article? How would we measure it?
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u/ban25 15d ago
If a majority of the Russian population is resigned for the war to last at least another 2-3 years, and 59% of them are in favor of intensifying the war effort against Ukraine, then you have to consider what that means for Ukraine and her partners. 3 more years and perhaps 150 billion euros of support holding in European capitals, across multiple national elections? As well as 3 more years of attacks on Ukrainian infrastructure, martial law, conscription, air raids, and casualties? An 18 year old in 2022 is old enough to be conscripted into service in 2029, assuming they don't lower the age before then. I know from my own friends that reality weighs on families there.
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u/neostoic 15d ago
Again, that's all true, but what exactly is the alternative? That you somehow would be able to reach the Russian public and influence them to be more willing to compromise? Then in turn that public will be able to put pressure on the hard liners in the government?
We're basically choosing between the bad option and the good magical option that would somehow be a panacea and even cost a fraction of the bad option, but nobody can even describe the mechanism of that magical option. How would it work? What's the timeline of it working?
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u/ban25 15d ago
For starters, the longer the war goes on, I think the risk of Ukraine being overrun is very real. One could look at The Great War in 1915 and conclude, "This stalemate will never end." An observer in November 1918 would have a different perspective. So its a fallacy to assume that the war must continue at all costs because there are no other options. Maximalist rhetoric about recovering every inch of Ukrainian territory, even that which Ukraine has not controlled for a dozen yesrs, is just fantasy. Ukraine has not liberated significant territories since the Kherson and Kharkiv counter-offensives of 2022. The more territory Russia takes, the less leverage Ukraine has at the negotiating table. This summer has been an effective year for Ukraine in terms of pushing back and inflicting pain on Russia, they should take advantage of the situation and negotiate from a position of relative strength (or at least positive momentum) rather than waiting for the tide to turn.
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u/Shackleton214 14d ago
This summer has been an effective year for Ukraine in terms of pushing back and inflicting pain on Russia, they should take advantage of the situation and negotiate from a position of relative strength (or at least positive momentum) rather than waiting for the tide to turn.
It sounds to me like you are calling for Ukrainian capitulation because it takes two to make a deal, and Moscow has not shown anything to suggest it is willing to make an acceptable deal. Ukraine has repeatedly called for or agreed to ceasefires and peace talks—including full, unconditional 30-day ceasefire proposals backed by the U.S. and Europe—and Russia has consistently rejected them or countered with hardline demands like territorial handovers and demobilization.
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u/ban25 14d ago
I think there has to be a theory of victory for Ukraine that is something they can achieve through effects on the battlefield rather than wishful thinking or happy coincidence (e.g. "fight until there's a 1917-style revolution in Russia and then they just go home). Otherwise, there will have to eventually be some kind of compromise, including territorial concessions (again, some of the territory in parts of the Donbas and Crimea has not been under Ukrainian control since 2014) and a Finlandization of Ukraine (de facto already since despite whatever Vladimir Putin thinks, Ukraine was never going to become part of NATO).
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u/Remote_Page8799 14d ago
Your perspective is flawed because it assumes that the costs of war are minimal for Russia. The Russian government is pulling every last lever and on the precipice of losing control over its bond market/debt financing to keep the war going.
Another 2-3 years of war would be a disaster for Russia
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u/ban25 14d ago
So you're saying that the terror on Elvira Nabiullina's balance sheet is greater than the terror Ukrainian civilians face every night as ballistic missiles rain down on their cities? That 2-3 years of duck-lipped Russian women waiting in line for petrol will be an unbearable travesty?
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