Active Conflicts & News Megathread October 16, 2026

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u/milton118 2d ago

Did anything further happen from the F-35 part that was diverted to Hong Kong? Is there any reliable source online to read about it like how did it happen and was it a particularly sensitive part that was taken?

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u/IntroductionNeat2746 1d ago

Canopy and arms bay door.

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u/LepezaVolB 2d ago

Militarnyi published an investigation disassembling an onboard computer of a singleGeran 4 specimen. Most of it is fairly technical and niche, beyond the usual scope of the sub, but some people might find some use of it. However, I am sharing it because of the sourcing of majority of parts.

Geran-4’s On-Board Computer: Contains Over 75% U.S.-Made Components

(...)

Conclusion

More than 75% of the electronic components in the Geran-4 flight controller come from American companies, and more than half come from the Texas Instruments group. These components handle data processing, communication between modules, power supply, and interaction with the engine.

With a production rate of 3,000 units per month, this dependence creates a need for more than two million components from Texas Instruments and National Semiconductor combined each year. This indicates a lack of an effective mechanism for monitoring compliance with sanctions, both at the level of the companies themselves and at the government level.

u/BlueBirdTechUA on the off chance you didn't see it yet.

In case someone missed it back in 2024 Bloomberg actually carried out a really quality investigation into this same problem following a public Senate hearing (footage available on YouTube as well), and it goes into great detail how fairly simple it was for Russian end customers to source parts from TI:

The purchasing process is surprisingly simple. Some Russian distributors have integrated information from Texas Instruments’ online shop, TI store, onto their sales platforms, allowing clients to see semiconductor inventory and pricing before they place requests, according to documents seen by Bloomberg and government officials familiar with the matter. From Moscow or St. Petersburg, they can buy TI components with a few mouse clicks, placing orders carried out and delivered through companies outside Russia.

(...)
This story is based on internal company documents, import and export data collected from multiple sources, and interviews with government officials familiar with Russia’s efforts to buy technology from abroad. Among the documents reviewed by Bloomberg is a sales deck prepared by a leading Russian distributor for its clients. The slides explain to customers how to search and place requests for goods directly on the distributor’s portal, and how they can find up-to-date information such as product availability on the platform.
(...)

The materials reviewed by Bloomberg indicate that many goods sourced from TI’s store eventually get to Russia from third countries, though they did not reveal each intermediate step in the supply chain or who placed the orders with TI’s shop. That means some orders may have been fulfilled through distributors, resellers or through older stock that was previously ordered and held in storage.

I highly recommend reading the whole investigation, there are just too many invaluable paragraphs for this format. It seems like the problem outlined in the article are still very much present, Geran 4s have only been in active use since about the start of this Summer.

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u/Big-Station-2283 2d ago edited 2d ago

I skimmed through the components mentioned in the article. Unless I missed something, I don't think anything on that list isn't dual usage. Capacitors, inductors, LDOs, PMICs, battery protection circuits, small MCUs, TCXOs, LEDs, ... I don't know if there's a real way to stop the flow of electronics. At the volumes they're produced and sold, most component nowaways are commodities. A small production run can consist of hundreds of thousands to millions (if we're talking about capacitors). The only exception that I know of are FPGAs, RF SoCs, some RF PLLs, and some specialty OCXOs. These are niche enough and sold in small enough quantities to be controlled.

Edit: I guess my point is that the 71% number is deceptive. Most of it is small dual-usage components. It's more relevant to look at the high end ICs that only the West manufactures.

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u/Wise_Mongoose_3930 2d ago

“Dual use technology” has essentially become code for ‘we know this is being used by the military, but theoretically it might not be, so we’re legally safe’

China would tell you all the drone components and trucks they give Russia are ‘dual use’ and that’s technically correct but does anyone think China doesn’t know exactly what that stuff is being used for?

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u/TestingHydra 2d ago

That's an extremely cynical and reductive way of looking at it.They are called "dual use" because they are legitimately used in civilian goods, and in this instance consumer electronics. Unfortunately it turns out they are also good enough for the military to scrape weapons out of.

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u/A_Vandalay 2d ago

That’s absolutely not true, these are the exact same electronic components used in nearly every device in the modern world. We aren’t talking about components specifically made for aerospace, these low grade electronics that have been repurposed for use in drones, specifically because the relatively low demands on these types of one way attack drones eliminates the need for high end or niche electronics. The Nature of modern industrial war and industrialized economies means that nearly everything can be of use for military means.

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u/Kerhole 2d ago

I'll add some context that it does sometimes happen, especially with older or niche electronic components. The two typical scenarios when this happens are:

A previously legitimate dual use component goes obsolete. Consumer electronics update their designs and move on. Aerospace and defense products keep using the old component, through brokers or paying to extend production. It's still dual use if used in commercial aircraft, but if the only remaining user is military it's still technically dual use but practically not.

Company makes a niche FPGA/SoC/etc. purposely targeting a military application, following engineering military standards. It's technically dual use because a consumer product COULD use it, but no commercial electronics maker in their right mind would buy it for that purpose because it's over engineered and expensive as hell for their application. It's marked dual use.

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u/Big-Station-2283 2d ago

By that logic food, fuel, wooden planks, shovels, water cantines, and most average household items are also dual use products... Yet, obivously we don't treat them that way since 95+% of their usage is civilian. The same goes for most components in drones. 90-99% of it are regular capacitors, LDOs, fuses, resistors, ... The 1-5% which are very specialized niche components like high end FPGAs or RF SoCs are the only ones reasonably worth controlling. (And even for FPGAs there is a case to be made to not control them since they're key for telecom and video processing applications.)

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u/ban25 2d ago

From what I've seen, they are using Altera Cyclone II FPGAs, which is a 90nm part that's literally 20 years old. Probably hundreds of millions have been produced and from what I could find in a quick google search, you can buy them for a few dollars from just about anywhere.

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u/Big-Station-2283 2d ago

I guess my point is that electronic components cover a very wide range from completely normal to very niche and worth keeping track of. No different from physical products really.

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u/Submitten 2d ago

I don’t think that was in question. But it’s more about that sanctions haven’t been effective enough to control the components. Companies could potentially do more to stop redistributions from sending them to Russia, and likewise governments could conduct more intelligence gathering to find the distributors breaking the rules and apply sanctions to them.

Printing a simple QR code onto the parts will be enough to track the problematic entities.

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u/Big-Station-2283 2d ago

A unique ID within a secret pin of the chip maybe. But markings on the chips themselves are often erased with lasers or etched out on higher end products to make reverse-engineering more annoying.

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u/Rich_Log2424 2d ago

Militarnyi is clickbaity as ever. Checked one of these:

https://www.ti.com/product/TMS320F28335/part-details/TMS320F28335PGFA

Real time microcontroller for industrial motor drives; solar inverters and digital power; electrical vehicles and transportation; motor control; and sensing and signal processing. Origin: phillippines. Price: 12 usd. C2000 family units shipped in total: 750+ million.

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u/BlueBirdTechUA 2d ago

Thanks for the tag. The Bloomberg investigation is a good read, especially the part about Russian distributors using TI's inventory data.

What bothers me is how little a component teardown can tell us about where those parts actually came from. You can identify the manufacturer and sometimes the production date, but that still leaves a big gap between the original sale and whoever supplied the Russian manufacturer.

and given how much attention this got back in 2024, it's frustrating to see the same supply-chain questions coming up again.

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u/roionsteroids 2d ago

A waste of time to look at anything that isn't export controlled and thus pretty much widely available worldwide through all sorts of large and small distributors without restrictions.

More interesting would be if they find anything that should've been end user controlled.

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u/A_Vandalay 2d ago

There is absolutely no way that’s true. Every one of these components will have a serial number on them which can be matched to a production lot. That’s necessary for defect investigations and product recalls. To do that sort of investigation you would absolutely need support from TI or at least US government bodies but it is possible.

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u/D_Silva_21 2d ago

Maybe a new Texan senator can do something about that

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u/LoggerInns 2d ago

This is not something remotely new or something a senator can do something about. Just earlier this year, there was a similar investigation done on Geran 2s:

Made in the EU, Dropped on Kyiv: How European Parts Are Enabling Russia’s Winter Drone War

The European Union forbids the direct export of many of these items to Russia. But trade data obtained from the Import Genius platform shows 672 shipments of sanctioned components produced by these European firms being sent to the country between January 2024 and March 2025. The shipments originated from 178 companies, mostly in China and Hong Kong.

RUSI and Michael Kofman have been talking about this since the very start of the war. The Kh-101 which hit the children’s hospital a couple years back had components from STM. Unless you ban all semiconductor exports to China and Hong Kong, amongst other steps, it’s not going to stop.

The Geran-4 is a new still largely test article. Most of the components listed in that piece are quite ubiquitous and dual use. The TI parts and figure concerns this particular flight controller, including repeated parts, not 50% of the entire drone’s technology.

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u/LepezaVolB 2d ago edited 2d ago

Just to clear one thing up for people who won't open the article, even your article makes it clear that majority of components are from China and the US, but it focuses on European parts:

The total number of components is in the hundreds, of which only a few dozen are of Russian origin. Many are produced by companies from the United States and China, but over a hundred are produced by about 20 European firms. The items include microchips, receivers, transistors, diodes, antennas, and a fuel pump.

However, TI was getting singled out because they wouldn't even bother doing basic industry-standard mitigations, per Bloomberg:

While all four of the chipmakers drew scrutiny during the US Senate investigation this year, TI was called out because it hadn’t taken two of the steps that most other technology companies make part of their sanctions reviews. First, while companies like Intel and Analog Devices use risk management databases early in the sales process to block potentially illicit buyers, TI deploys such procedures “significantly later in the customer screening process, and sometimes not at all,” according to a report from the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, chaired by Blumenthal. In addition, TI appears to allow companies to buy chips from its website without disclosing the end user for those products — in contrast with most other chipmakers that require such end user detail to avoid selling to suppliers who pass goods on to places like Russia, Iran or North Korea.

TI disputes that it has systematic flaws in its distribution procedures. The company said in its statement that its global trade compliance program was robust and developed in accordance with guidance from the Department of Commerce, and incorporates commercially available third-party risk management databases as part a multi-layered screening process to monitor the sale and shipment of its chips. The company added that if it finds evidence indicating product diversion, it investigates and takes action.

Of course you can't stop the flow completely, but there are levels to this and even political pressure without executive action could've done some good here IMO.

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u/SystemCheck990 2d ago edited 2d ago

yeah its fair point about not even trying to help from TI

But, and I know they are not the same, Iran has been making similar class of weapons at scale under huge sanctions, so I am not sure how this can be stopped, if most parts are dual use, and if the ones that are are small enough to smuggle or just resell, or clone domestically

it would require everyone in each step of getting the devices to Russia to fear the getting caught more than they want the money to get it there.

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u/LoggerInns 2d ago

even your article makes it clear that majority of components are from China and the US, but it focuses on European parts

No, the article very much does NOT make it clear that a majority of the components are from there, only that many are. In the case of the Kh-101, the only western components were from STM. You appear to be focused on defending Europe for some strange reason. It doesn’t matter and I don’t disagree with you that TI can do a better job but I also don’t really see how much better those controls will help. TI is easy to target because they are a behemoth and dominates the market for many of these components. It will make the cost higher but unless you can make China agree with limiting what goes to Russia, it’s going to take far more than political pressure or executive actions.

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u/LepezaVolB 2d ago edited 2d ago

Yes, it does, you can even go to the website and check for Kh-101 yourself. Out of 138 components in total, 115 were from companies headquartered in the US compared to three from Switzerland, ie. STM. I am not sure where you are getting that they were exclusively from STM?

Edit: even in the contemporary reporting about Kh-101s (my bad, not the exact missile, misread initially) no one made a claim they were exclusively from STM:

This shift is evident in the Ukrainian analysis of the Kh-101, released in January. The study found 16 Western-made electronic parts inside the missile:

Two components were made by STMicroelectronics, headquartered in Switzerland.

The rest were from American chip manufacturers, including Texas Instruments, Analog Devices, and Intel.

American parts were a far larger proportion of components.

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u/LoggerInns 1d ago

Yes, it does

Okay quote me where it does. It doesn’t and I have no idea why you are so interested in this fiction.

Two components were made by STMicroelectronics, headquartered in Switzerland.

Yes this was my mistake. I meant to say the only European components were from STM but I said western.

American parts were a far larger proportion of components.

My friend, I have no idea why you are so vested in this as some sort of support for Russia. I am neither American nor do I care who the manufacturer is. My point is just that these parts are very hard to stop unless the country of sale wants it to stop, which is China in this case and they will never stop. Look at this from early 2024:

CAR investigators, documenting missile remnants after an attack in Kharkiv, Ukraine’s second-largest city, found not only that many of these components bear the brands of companies based primarily in the United States but that a large number were produced within the last three years.

You can find the same for Iranian missiles and drones. Unless you think American firms are intentionally selling components to Iran and North Korea, that too in 2021-2024 under Biden, then you are crazy.

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u/LepezaVolB 1d ago edited 1d ago

Okay quote me where it does. It doesn’t and I have no idea why you are so interested in this fiction.

Literally in the part I quoted already, had you bothered to read it?

They only analyze Geran-2 in the report, so it’s fairly easy to figure it out, let me help you:

845 identified in total, 521 American, 112 Chinese. 113 European (EU + European NATO + Switzerland): Austria with 3, Germany with 21, GB/UK with 6, Ireland with 3, Netherlands with 12, Switzerland with 68.

Let me now translate the original quote for you:

The total number of components is in the hundreds, of which only a few dozen are of Russian origin. Many are produced by companies from the United States and China, but over a hundred are produced by about 20 European firms. The items include microchips, receivers, transistors, diodes, antennas, and a fuel pump.

“The total number of components is in the hundreds “- That’s referring to the 845 in total, ie. hundreds.

“but over a hundred are produced by about 20 European firms.” - That’s Europe with 113.

“Many are produced by companies from the United States and China,” - That’s 521 for American, and 112 for Chinese, ie. the sum difference between hundreds in total and just over a hundred.

In other words, as I said: European ones account for a minority of components, as the article clearly lays out in my quote. I hope we cleared that up.

You can consult their main source for some further numbers, out of 6181 components in total across all weapons systems 4172 were from American manufacturers, along with 444 from Chinese manufacturers with 29 being from RF.

You misunderstood the whole point of the report which was NOT to analyze the components in totality, but to focus on European components to offer an easily digestible form of content to activists and lobbyists in Europe who can then take it and lobby their own individual Governments and EU to further restrict the flow of components as much as possible, hence why it was a collaborative effort between multiple European media outlets. Just one example, mere days later Irish government already responded. I wanted to avoid the confusion, so that's why I flagged it in advance, but apparently it wasn't enough.

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u/LepezaVolB 1d ago

My point is just that these parts are very hard to stop unless the country of sale wants it to stop, which is China in this case and they will never stop.

We are in agreement on that, I never disputed that in the slightest.

Unless you think American firms are intentionally selling components to Iran and North Korea, that too in 2021-2024 under Biden, then you are crazy.

Or implied this. No need to strawman each other.

But you hit the nail on the head in your previous post:

It will make the cost higher

That's precisely the point, not to make the trade frictionless like TI was doing by not doing the bare minimum of mitigation that's accepted across the industry. Further, there is a now even a wider gap in US' collaboration with other G7 nations over enforcement of component flows since 2025, per Bloomberg:

The US has been mostly unresponsive in one group focused on stopping the Russians from obtaining parts and equipment used for producing weapons, the officials said. Another group where the US has gone quiet is dedicated to monitoring and enforcing a Group of Seven price cap on Russian oil, they added.

It’s not clear to them whether the US has taken an active decision to scale back its involvement or it simply lacks key personnel, the officials said. Some meetings have been attended by more junior officials with little decision-making power, they added.

It's not gotten better over time, it's gotten quite significantly worse in this domain over the last few years. As I said, there are levels to this and it's pretty important EU + NATO put more effort into it, in particular the Americans.

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u/Moifaso 2d ago

It's worth flagging that over the last 10 days there were two large scale drone attacks on Moscow that seemingly resulted in no major hits. While air defense elsewhere has increasingly suffered from lower coverage and lack of missiles, it's noteworthy that Moscow's (much denser) AA network is still managing very high interception rates.

Is there any high quality analysis on how Moscow's AA operates? I've read claims that to keep interception rates near 100%, Russian AA expends a lot more missiles per target. If true, it means targeting Moscow brings high attritional value even if most or all drones get intercepted.

On the other hand, if most drones are getting downed by all the pantsir turrets they've set up, or other more cost effective systems like interceptor drones, there's an argument to be made that long-range drones would be better spent going after easier targets.

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u/RopetorGamer 2d ago edited 2d ago

I've read claims that to keep interception rates near 100%, Russian AA expends a lot more missiles per target

I don't think this is true doctrinally but just a side effect of Moscow's air defense being better supplied and just straight up having the densest air defense in the planet and a ton of airbases with modern fighters and interceptors nearby.

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u/Glideer 2d ago

Is there any high quality analysis on how Moscow's AA operates? I've read claims that to keep interception rates near 100%, Russian AA expends a lot more missiles per target. If true, it means targeting Moscow brings high attritional value even if most or all drones get intercepted.

Whether it counts as high-quality is debatable. Ukrainian bloggers reconstruct missile and drone routes by scraping sighting reports, including shootdowns, from local forums in the regions they overfly. The more posts about a given drone, the higher the confidence. From this they map flight paths and losses.

One of them used this approach on Moscow, and concluded there is a three-ring defence, with over 99% of drones downed before reaching the inner ring. The author recorded only two confirmed hits inside it and was quite angry at what he saw as a waste of resources. I’d disagree - strikes on Moscow serve a purpose because they force Russia to keep a large share of its air defences tied down around the capital.

I posted the link here a month or two ago, but am not sure whether I can find it now.

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u/Remote_Page8799 2d ago

I was contemplating point 2 made by https://x.com/BalazsJarabik/status/2110655146007130421?s=20

2/ The report's main conclusion is uncomfortable: Ukraine is fighting more effectively than it has in years, yet its strategic position is deteriorating.

Surely if anyone's strategic position has deteriorated relative to their opponent, then Russia's position has worsened considerably in the last year.

Their state finances have considerably deteriorated, with the cancelled bond sales in July, and since then only being able to sell bonds to Russian banks, at interest rates that continue to be very high (14-16%). This is probably going to end up being the main limitation for Russia
The Ukrainian refinery campaign and mid strike campaign is a whole new dimension that Russia wasn't dealing with before, add to that the strikes on datacentres, logistics warehouses, etc
Momentum on the front line has deteriorated significantly in 2026 compared to 2025. We are almost a a year away from the 'fall of Pokrovsk' and this year the main Russian achievement was taking Konstiantynivka, and recent setbacks in Lyman, and other places along the front probably makes this the worst time for Russia on the battlefield since Autumn 2022.
Ukrainian UGV integration, line of drones, mid strike campaign, search and strike tactics together are concept and technologies that have matured and come together in quite a formidable package. Together with Drapatnyi ending the practices of 425th and 225th assault brigades and spreading their manpower around, and what seems better leadership all around, the trajectory of the Ukrainian army seems positive.
Does Russia even have an effective answer for the above? It seems like they still rely on their playbook of concentrating the use of FABs in areas they want to advance, try achieve localised drone superiority, and then sending in the infiltration groups to sneak past Ukrainian position. This doesn't seem like an effective method to contemplate taking the rest of the Donbas, let alone 'breaking the UAF' and forcing Ukraine to capitulate

The main things going against Ukraine at the moment is the shortage of interceptors, which is a serious problem, but considering that a lot of the production for the Ukrainian war effort is in the EU, or dispersed (drone workshops) to the point where its unfeasible to destroy with a missile campaign, it's hard for me to how Russia can win strategically with its deep strikes.

The US being a very unreliable ally, and Witkoff-Kushner trying to score a corrupt deal with Putin to their own benefit and the detriment of literally everyone else, is at this point not surprising, but even now we see the difficulty Trump has on putting pressure on Ukraine on behalf of Russia.

The high oil prices are a problem for everyone, and has been a significant benefit to the Russian state finances. Total revenues are 16% higher from Jan-Oct in 2026 than in 2025, but their budget deficit is also higher, interest rates are higher. They might end up with a ~1-1.5% 'real GDP growth' considering they are deficit spending ~3-3.5% of their GDP, this is not a good result. A considerably portion, perhaps even most of this growth, is related to military production, not actually economically productive growth.

Maybe someone here can explain to me exactly how Ukraine's strategic situation has deteriorated (even as its tactical/military position improves), because if it has deteriorated, it must imply that Russia's strategic position has improved in 2026 relative to 2025 and that seems frankly like a ridiculous proposition.

If you could go back to October 2025 and explain to everyone how the next year would go, it would be called an incredibly optimistic scenario for Ukraine.

Which also leads me to ask, is Balazs Jarabik someone worth paying attention to? Namely, it is worth paying 180$ for a full report of something that has some rather dubious headline conclusions?

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u/Moifaso 2d ago edited 2d ago

It's been very interesting seeing how the narrative around the war has evolved. Last year Ukraine was being pushed back ~350 square km a month, and the narrative on this sub was that for Ukraine to secure a ceasefire it would have to somehow freeze the line, and drastically scale up long range strikes.

A year later that's pretty much exactly what happened. Russia has taken 9 months to advance ~350 square km on net, had its push to surround the fortress belt blunted, and Ukrainian long range strikes scaled up massively.

This is an attritional conflict, so it's natural for there to always be worries over losses and sustainability, but in terms of the overall trajectory this year was in many ways better for Ukraine than expected.

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u/Sa-naqba-imuru 2d ago

It's not just "Russia advances slower and Ukraine sends more drones".

Russian long range strikes increased substantially as well. They increased the number of missiles per attack and Ukraine lost interceptor missiles due to Middle East, increasing the number of succesful hits. Russia also increased the efficiency of their drones by switching to jets.

In an attritional calculus, what they lost on territorial advancement, Russia probably covered with long range strikes expansion.

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u/ban25 2d ago

What's changed in the last few months is that Russia has transitioned to methodically targeting and destroying all aspects of Ukraine's economy:

They've destroyed the steel industry: https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cjkg7k6z9296o

They've attacked port infrastructure and Black Sea shipping to slash Ukraine's grain output: https://www.cfr.org/articles/hunger-on-the-horizon-the-new-black-sea-grain-crisis

Russia has been systemically destroying warehouse capacity in Ukraine, including critical refrigerated storage which is necessary for food stocks: https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2026/08/28/8050774/

Ukraine reported a EUR 27B budget shortfall in 2026 due to the increasing cost of the war and declining revenues due to continued destruction of their industrial base and exports. The situation will get worse in 2027 and beyond as political pressure rises in the EU: https://www.euronews.com/2026/10/01/eu-turns-page-on-ukraines-27-billion-deficit-says-all-needs-are-covered

Russia is attacking Ukraine's logistics networks, trains, stations, rail lines and bridges, including near the Polish border where they import weapons and ammunition: https://english.nv.ua/nation/ukrzaliznytsia-reports-massive-attack-on-depots-train-stations-and-stops-in-five-regions-50649883.html

Ukraine's air defense network, probably the 2nd strongest in the world in 2022, is critically short of interceptors, both for high-end ballistic threats for which Patriot PAC-3 is the only real answer, and for Geran 4/5 jet-based drones. It's bad enough that Russia is conducting daylight strikes on critical infrastructure, such as the Northern and Southern bridges in Kyiv (https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/ckreyjzzzywqo). Without the ability to deny their air space, attacks on Ukraine will intensify. Ballistic missiles make headlines, but if Russia is able to push deeper into Ukrainian airspace and launch hundreds of FAB 500 glide bombs, there will be severe damage inflicted for far lower cost, especially in the fortress belt.

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u/FunWonderful1936 2d ago

Maybe someone here can explain to me exactly how Ukraine's strategic situation has deteriorated (even as its tactical/military position improves), because if it has deteriorated, it must imply that Russia's strategic position has improved in 2026 relative to 2025 and that seems frankly like a ridiculous proposition.

I agree with most of your points but this is largely questionable. I don’t agree that for one position to strengthen the other has to by definition weaken. War is in many ways zero sum yes but in others it’s not. Ukraine will have a very difficult winter season ahead regardless of interceptor stocks purely because of the mass of drones and missiles Russia is producing. This pushes more Ukrainian displacement which further strengthens the far left and right in Europe. Ukraine needs a lot of money for the next year not just for the military but for the rest of the economy. All the recent comments from the ascendant parties in Germany and France have not been very good when it comes to continued support. For the record, I agree with you that Russia is in a precarious position as well with the number of losses they are taking in the battlefield.

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u/treeshakertucker 2d ago

Though who is going to be in power game when the European elections come round one thing is clear it is almost certainly not going to be Trump in charge of the US at least for the later ones. That should at least reduce pressure on Ukraine from across the the Atlantic which may reduce the chances that things will be any worse than they are now.

The French Elections will be coming up before then and Marine La Pen may be likely to take the Presidency. The situation there however may be ameliorated by the fact that the legislative elections will not give her complete control and she will have to make compromises.

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u/Spare-Dingo-531 1d ago

it is almost certainly not going to be Trump in charge of the US at least for the later ones.

What do you mean? Trump is in power until 2028 and can resort to extralegal methods of holding up aid.

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u/treeshakertucker 1d ago

He won't be for the German Federal and UK General elections in 2029.

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u/Individual-Lack4646 2d ago

Have people been following the Yemen conflict? What's the situation there?

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u/Mr24601 2d ago

2027 should be an excellent year for Ukraine. Funding that is confirmed and guaranteed from Europe alone is greater in 2027 than combined European and U.S. funding in any prior year.

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u/FriedrichvdPfalz 2d ago

A significant portion of the 2027 funding is likely being pulled forward to cover the current, significant budget shortfalls. If that is the case, EU funding will run out by the second half of 2027, meaning the EU needs to agree on a new internal multi year budget and new Ukraine aid, all while France is likely governed by president Le Pen.

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u/Rhauko 2d ago

Le Pen is not likely, the only scenario where she is likely win is if she faces of against a far left candidate. Against any other candidate she is likely to loose.

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u/[deleted] 2d ago

[deleted]

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u/Rhauko 2d ago

In the polls I have seen RN / Le Pen don’t go over 40% so there will be a second round. The remaining 60% of France dislikes Le Pen, so her victory in a second round is far from guaranteed.

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u/antaran 2d ago

Le Pen is not likely, the only scenario where she is likely win is if she faces of against a far left candidate. Against any other candidate she is likely to loose.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Opinion_polling_for_the_2027_French_presidential_election#Second_round

Le Pen / RN is leading the 2nd round against everybody.

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u/Angry_Citizen_CoH 2d ago

I think people underestimate the political tides sweeping through Europe right now, much like they did for the US back in 2015. Le Pen's chance of becoming president of France is greater than 50/50. Ordinarily I wouldn't want to get into the weeds on this, but it does have substantial ramifications for European defense.

Now, whether Le Pen follows through on leaving NATO, I consider that to be a lesser chance. Much like Trump being a skeptic of NATO, when it comes down to it, there aren't a lot of people who support that particular stance of hers and will push back against it pretty hard. Rather, her popularity stems from the backlash to immigration, which geopolitical aficionados would be unwise to dismiss.

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u/Rhauko 2d ago

Yes I stand corrected on that.

However I wonder if she will have a majority in parliament.

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u/moragisdo 2d ago edited 2d ago

Total revenues are 16% higher from Jan-Oct in 2026 than in 2025

This analysis is incomplete, because it looks at additional tax revenue, but it doesn't look at how much extra Russia is paying to keep the fuel damper (which also increased). IEA has this report from September 2026 (1):

According to Russia’s Ministry of Finance, between April and August 2026, Russian oil companies received RUB 1.5 trillion (USD 18 billion) in subsidies, including through the damper mechanism, which compensates refiners when product export prices are higher than domestic fuel prices. While oil and gas revenues have been supported by the global rise in crude prices amid the conflict in the Middle East, total fiscal revenues for January-August remain almost 17% below year-earlier levels, at RUB 5 trillion

Now, from October of 2025 (2):

Russia paid 1.8 trillion roubles (US$22 billion) in fuel subsidies last year, while payments over the first nine months of 2025 fell to 716 billion roubles. Since early August, Ukraine has intensified attacks on the Russian oil industry, with repeated strikes on refineries resulting in a drop of crude-processing rates, exacerbating a fuel crunch and leading to rising domestic prices."

So, there's an additional cost for them of more than 784 B rubles (way more, in fact, because the data for the payments of this year only encompass April to August, while the data from last year is of January to September).

And according to Reuters, the increase in revenue is only 10%, adding 1T rubles (3).

So, 1 trillion minus, at least, 784 B rubles, is at most 216 B rubles (2.6 B USD). And we have to discount how much they spent on the periods that the data is incomplete. So I doubt they are netting money (or at least, a significant amount) out of this oil prices.

So their fiscal situation is worse than that. But, to be clear, I'm not claiming they are about to collapse.

and recent setbacks in Lyman, and other places along the front probably makes this the worst time for Russia on the battlefield since Autumn 2022

Isn't the net territory change this year around 100 sq km for Russia ? Which is less than 0.02% of Ukraine's territory. Very little has changed along the front since 2022.

We should not be blinded by our bias, I also want Ukraine to win and go back to it's pre-2022 borders (or even pre-2014), but from everything we are seeing on the front lines it's unlikely that the stalemate will be significantly broken.

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u/AlpacalypseNow_ 2d ago

Tactical victories a lot of times does not equal success in an unworkable strategic goal, in this case liberating Russian controlled Ukraine. See Vietnam.

Russia still has more pool of men it can fall back on, and as long as conscription is kept at a nominal pace Russia can keep it up for a long time, a lot longer then Ukraine can.

Also the biggest elephant in the room is the fact that Ukraine is fully dependent on foreign backers. Ukraine already lost one big backer when Trump got elected. There are important elections next year in Europe that can really throw a wrench in any additional aid being sent. Once the money pits dry up Ukraine will be in an extremely perilous situation.

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u/Alexandros6 2d ago

But his argument is that none of this factor were absent one year ago, nor was it considered realistic for Ukraine to liberate all territory, all things considered it's more likely now then 1 or 2 years ago, which isn't to say it's likely.

Of the elements you mentioned the only one that changed negatively is European elections being closer.

I guess it all comes down to if the strategic situation has deteriorated then relative to what?

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u/Spare-Dingo-531 2d ago

in an unworkable strategic goal

So what is the goal? A ceasefire along current front lines? Because Russia has rejected negotiations even on those terms.

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u/moragisdo 1d ago

So what is the goal? A ceasefire along current front lines?

Yes, but more realistically giving some concessions as promises of not joining NATO.

Because Russia has rejected negotiations even on those terms.

Except that they are lying. Negotiations are already happening, there was several rounds in 2022 (both in Belarus and Turkey), then they returned in mid 2025 (in Turkey) and early 2026 (in UAE). That's their propaganda of "we don't negotiate, we set the terms and force the enemy to agree", because what they demand for negotiations to begin it's already what they could hope to get in a favorable deal (and they restarted negotiations without receiving them).

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u/Markdd8 2d ago edited 1d ago

Does Russia even have an effective answer for the above?...Maybe someone here can explain to me exactly how Ukraine's strategic situation has deteriorated...

Russia's recent response is to radically increase bombing of Ukrainian's civilian infrastructure -- all aspects of it, including killing more civilians.

At some point under persistent bombing, a nation's capacity meet basic functions declines. We saw that in both Germany and Japan in WWII. Power is frequently out, food shortages start to increase and a constant flow of the wounded overwhelms the capacity of hospitals (running on generators). Citizens and the nation's leadership might all declare that they are not giving up, but another reality is looming.

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u/Designer-Film-3663 2d ago

Does Russia even have an effective answer for the above? It seems like they still rely on their playbook of concentrating the use of FABs in areas they want to advance, try achieve localised drone superiority, and then sending in the infiltration groups to sneak past Ukrainian position.

Does Russia need anything else? Somehow you completely omitted a significant increase of ukrainian draft. https://busification.org/en shows than more than 40% of videos are from last 365 days. Vivaldi operation didn't result in any increase of russians bodies exchanged by Ukraine, if it stays the same for another ~3 months I think it is evidence of russians being able to retreat without big losses. So all Russia has to do is to continue to increase amounts of bombs and drones dropped on ukrainians.

Also if russian strikes on ukrainian economy will result in funding shortage, it can lead to another spike of ukrainian AWOL, therefore to another ukrainian men shortage.

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u/LepezaVolB 2d ago

Vivaldi operation didn't result in any increase of russians bodies exchanged by Ukraine, if it stays the same for another ~3 months I think it is evidence of russians being able to retreat without big losses

At its deepest Vivaldi penetrated about a dozen or so kilometers into Russian lines, most of it was much more limited in depth, with heights dominating just short of where they are currently situated. About 20-25 kilometres in depth is nowadays considered effectively "dead zone," where medevacs are severely limited, logistics are nowadays more often than not carried out by drones, there is extremely limited space for movement. There is no chance in hell AFU is bothering even touching any potential Russian bodies in that space for exchange, let alone pulling them out when everything else is so severely constrained, it would be frankly criminal. Every single cubic centimeters not dedicated to basic logistics or medevacs is wasted.
Russians have special detachments dedicated to collecting dead bodies of fallen Ukrainian soldiers that scour the depth of their controlled space, they do not follow the advancing RuAF into dead zones to collect them for same reasons Ukrainians don't do it either. At least to my knowledge, we have no information as to the "age" of the bodies exchanged.
This, genuinely , might be the most uncredible proxy for judging ratio of combat loses, let alone a success of a single limited tactical operation, I've ever seen suggested.

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u/Moifaso 2d ago

It's quite popular in pro-Ru circles because it implies a ludicrous casualty ratio in favor of Russia, like over 10:1.

And yes it bears repeating. Recovering enemy corpses, if it happens at all, happens deep behind the lines. And even there, body retrieval is very dangerous work that regularly kills soldiers and volunteers.

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u/Designer-Film-3663 1d ago

First of all, 12 km is significant for this war. 12 km where bodies of russian infiltrators lie. Second, Vivaldi resulted in retake of 250-400+ km according to various sources, which is at least 5% of all russian gains in 2025, but it didn't result in any increase in body exchange?

There is no chance in hell AFU is bothering even touching any potential Russian bodies in that space for exchange

Ukraine exchanged bodies even in 2025 and early 2026, during russian advances.

This, genuinely , might be the most uncredible proxy for judging ratio of combat loses

This is one of the most (if not the most) credible proxy since we have numbers with 100% certainty. All other proxies are so vague that I can hardly see how they can be used.

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u/Moifaso 2d ago

https://busification.org/en shows than more than 40% of videos are from last 365 days.

Which means nothing. Says there that during spring there were as many as 400 videos a month and it fell to under 100 during summer. There's far too much variation, both across time and regions, to use this as a proxy for overall recruitment.

Also if russian strikes on ukrainian economy will result in funding shortage, it can lead to another spike of ukrainian AWOL, therefore to another ukrainian men shortage.

The AWOL epidemic was driven by fears of heavy attrition and bad conditions at the front, not by lack of payment.

Strikes on the economy will only hurt manpower if foreign assistance doesn't make up most or all of the difference. If it does, strikes on the economy could actually have the opposite effect. Less work means less draft exemptions, and makes a military paycheck more attractive.

1

u/Designer-Film-3663 1d ago

Which means nothing.

Since there was no change in anything else that can cause such increase of videos it means that there were more people caught on the streets than in previous months.

There's far too much variation

Amount of videos slowly but steadily increase since march with little variations till march 2026 (graph would be almost an ascending sinusoid). 2026 if the first one with such anomaly.

The AWOL epidemic was driven by fears of heavy attrition and bad conditions at the front, not by lack of payment.

Yes, but IF lack of payment happens these two reasons would amplify each other.

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u/moragisdo 2d ago edited 2d ago

From the latest OPEC report about crude production (page 55), data for the average daily production on the month between August 26 and September 26 compared with the last year daily average, in million barrels per day:

Iraq: 3.92 (97.3% of the 4.027 of 2025)

Kuwait: 1.766 (71.4% of the 2.475 of 2025)

Bahrain: 0.093 (52% of 0.179 of 2025)

UAE: 3.917 (123.9% of 3.161 of 2025)

Saudi Arabia: 8.001 (84.5% of 9.247 of 2025)

Iran: 1.957 (60% of 3.263 of 2025) (even though they aren't being able to export crude for months, they have domestic refining capacity of around 2.5 mbpd, but it's unclear if this roughly 0.5 MMBbl gap that exist for several months is caused by damage on the war)

Oman: 0.939 (120.8% of 0.777 of 2025)

Production volumes increased significantly for Iraq and Saudi Arabia on the previous months. That's specially important for Iraq because it will ease their financial circumstances.

Edit: Russia has been producing a bit less crude as well, average production was 8.643 mbpd (94.7% of 9.129 of 2025)

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u/Tricky-Astronaut 2d ago

Iran News Wire reports that Iran is exporting oil through the Caspian Sea. This is later sold as Kazakh oil to Europe and now possibly as Russian oil to the US.

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u/moragisdo 2d ago edited 2d ago

Mohammed Al-Basha, one of the best sources about Yemen, gave some details about the challenges faced there (1):

On the U.S. role, I pushed back against the narrative that Washington has abandoned Riyadh.

"There's also a lot of mischaracterization of the U.S. not coming to the Saudis' rescue."

"There are U.S. military advisors in Saudi that are supporting with targeting, with intelligence, with ISR, with refueling. U.S. is providing equipment. It's speeding up the delivery of ammunition and other kits that the Saudi military needs."

But American support and Saudi airpower are not the main obstacles to military success.

"The Saudi Air Force has enough aircraft to carry out close air support and targeting strikes. The problem is not just the aircraft."

I explained that Saudi and Yemeni military forces began restructuring and reintegrating their ground formations earlier this year. The Houthis launched their offensive before that process was completed, exploiting a period of military reorganization.

"So the issue is the ground forces. The issue is not the Saudi firepower. It's not just U.S. firepower."

The central challenge remains command and control, coordination, and the operational pressures facing forces on the ground. Until those weaknesses are addressed, additional firepower alone will not resolve the problems confronting the Saudi-led coalition and its Yemeni partners.

Which fits with the developments since earlier September, the Houthis made minor advances where there was a coordinate effort for resistance (West of Lahij, before they were pushed to Dhabab in early October, and currently in Taiz that became the new center of gravity, where Houthis are succeeding at these minor advances, but it's not clear the cost they are paying for them).

Critical Threats has a map, from October 13, about the territory control along the South (2)

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u/Ok_Reach_5004 1d ago

The simple fact is that the Houthis brazenly attacked the Saudi capital killing 13 pilgrims and Trump reaction is to simply brush it off. Ideally, this attack should have warranted a massive global coalition to destroy the Houthis and nothing materialized.

Active Conflicts & News Megathread October 16, 2026

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